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The education system in the U.S. is in an adolescent stage of transformation as corporate 
education reform, driven by bipartisan efforts, becomes the new standard for education reform.  
Corporate education reform aims to privatize public education, and while it grew rapidly under 
George W. Bush and Barack Obama, the movement is sure to accelerate under the new Secretary 
of Education, Betsy Devos. 
At the same time as this increase of corporate education reform, there has also been a 
recent wave of teacher union militancy in response to this attack on public education.  Rank and 
file reform caucuses have been organizing around adopting a social movement unionism (SMU) 
to combat the neoliberal project of corporate education reform.  These caucuses in Philadelphia, 
Washington D.C., Newark, Milwaukee, and Minneapolis/St. Paul, have met varying success in 
winning leadership positions, internally reforming their union, and resisting corporate education 
reform, but they are some of the most active political groups opposing corporate education 
reform.   
This thesis examines teachers’ unions transformations from a service model to a social 
movement unionism model in response to corporate education reform and the efficacy of their 
resulting strategies and campaigns in combating corporate education reform, securing gains for 
membership, and building a broader class-focused politics.  The thesis hopes to answer these 
questions:  How does a reform caucus unseat incumbents, and once in that position of leadership, 
how does a union effectively rollout a reform project that changes members’ understanding of 
the union and their relationship within it?  How does a teachers’ social movement union build 
coalitions and gain public support?  What strategy does a SMU take to achieve its goals, does it 
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work, and why?  Can SMU effectively challenge bipartisan corporate education reform and 
develop support for a new class-based politics?    
 
The paper is divided into four primary chapters based around two case studies on the 
Chicago Teachers Union (CTU) and the United Teachers Los Angeles (UTLA) with an 
introduction and conclusion.  These two cases were chosen primarily as two different unions 
operating under similar circumstances; they are the third and second largest school districts in the 
continental U.S., they are both located in states considered Democratic, they have similarly 
underfunded schools and suffer from aggressive corporate education reform coming from the 
heads of the cities and schools.  The unions are also two of the most successful examples of 
teachers union’s transforming into a SMU and each then using a comparable strategy to achieve 
their demands. 
 The first chapter provides a theoretical understanding of SMU and corporate education 
reform to be used to provide context and a framework for analyzing the case studies.  The section 
will first explain the rise of SMU in the U.S and its main features, then explain the ideology 
behind the corporate education reform agenda and then the policies and impacts of the project. 
The next two chapters are the two case studies and they follow the same chapter structure 
divided into three sections.  The first section provides the context of the public schools system by 
examining budget crises and their causes and corporate education reform in the city.  The second 
section tracks the reform caucus’s rise to union leadership and their internal mobilization.  The 
third section explains the unions’ contract campaigns, strategies and actions towards the district 
under each leadership.  
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The fourth chapter is the analysis of the two case studies.  Following a similar structure to 
the previous chapters, this section analyzes the similarities and differences in first the context of 
the unions, then the strategy of union reform and coalition building, then each unions’ external 
contract campaigns.  This chapter will then draw out the significant lessons from the analysis of 
each section and evaluate SMU as a stronger model for teachers unions and as a potential way of 



















CHAPTER 1: Theory of Social Movement Unionism and Corporate 
Education Reform 
This chapter will first layout the basic idea behind social movement unionism (SMU); a 
union model based on the merging of an active union and social movements to promote and 
more effectively organize around a common politics.  The chapter will then track the 
development of SMU in the U.S. and its relationship to the rise of community and organizing 
models of unionism.  The following section explains the main features of SMU and why they 
matter, particularly focusing on coalition building and the political basis for the model.  As SMU 
has been a strategy used by teachers unions primarily in response to the rise of corporate 
education reform, the rest of the chapter explains corporate education reform, its policies and 
impacts.   
Social Movement Unionism 
 
Social movement unionism (SMU) was first used to describe an emerging pattern, in the 
1980’s, of unions joining other political organizations to form broad coalitions to fight for 
economic and social justice in developing countries.  The most immediate examples of this 
initial form of SMU was Cosatu’s (a trade union federation) involvement in the anti-apartheid 
struggle in South Africa, Kilusang Mayo Uno (a labor center) in the Philippines eventual 
organizing of a people’s strike, and Brazil’s Autenticos movement that resulted in the union 
forcing the military government to negotiate new wage levels through a public campaign.  In 
developed countries, the basic idea behind the model stays the same although the impacts have 
been far less significant.   
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Lowell Turner and Richard W. Hurd define SMU as member involvement and activism 
in an interactive process of partnering with broad, powerful social movements for mutually 
beneficial gains.1  Turner and Hurd also recognize that in a union’s effort to build social 
movement unionism they can lay the groundwork for a social movement wave.2  One of the most 
famous examples of SMU was the 1968 Memphis sanitation worker strikes during which Martin 
Luther King was killed.  The force of the union movement and of the civil rights movement 
amplified the power of each in their fight to gain common goals. 
Social movement unionism has gained in popularity in the U.S. primarily since the 
1990’s, when John Sweeney and his slate was elected to the leadership of the AFL-CIO and 
focused union activities on organizing non-union workers.  He dedicated $20 million to this 
effort by creating an organizing department.  Through Sweeney’s leadership, the organizing 
model became seen as a key strategy in reviving the labor movement and gained in popularity 
along with models that greatly overlap and have extended from it, such as the social movement 
model and community unionism.  The organizing model of unionism emphasizes unionizing new 
workers, often minority groups and/or workers in precarious employment who were previously 
seen as unorganizable.  The model relies on the work of full time organizers who train rank and 
file members to take a larger, more active role in their union and try to organize new firms as 
opposed to offering services to the union members.  The community model takes on many forms 
depending on the context it operates within, but it essentially takes the organizing model and 
extends its focus past the workplace by organizing local communities around social, economic, 
                                                
1 Lowell Turner and Richard W. Hurd, “Building Social Movement Unionism: The Transformation of the American 
Labor Movement,” in Rekindling the Movement: Labor’s Quest for Relevance in the Twenty-First Century, ed. L. 
Turner et al.  (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), 11. 
2 Turner and Hurd, “Building Social Movement Unionism,” 12. 
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or political issues that may be affecting the area and organizing around common identities past 
those of class or being a worker in the same place. 
Although there is no clear definition of a SMU model, there are a few main features of 
SMU.  These do not encompass SMU in its entirety.  The features include: an expressed political 
understanding and motivation for the activity; a highly active and involved membership with a 
voice in the union; and a focus on genuine coalition building to win mutually beneficial gains.  
The following section will go through each of these three main features of SMU.   
SMU views its struggle as being beyond just the gains of its members, but pushing for 
broader social and economic justice.  Freeman and Medoff break down understanding unions as 
institutions by arguing that they have two faces, “each of which leads to a different view of the 
institution.  A monopoly face, associated with their monopolistic power to raise wages, and a 
collective voice/institutional response face, associated with their representation of organized 
workers within enterprises.”3 
SMU was formed as a strategy to better respond to changes in the broader economic and 
political structure as neoliberalism took hold in the 1980s and the resulting patterns of inequality 
grew.  In this way, SMU attempts to use its institutional voice as far more than a collective 
worker’s voice, but as a voice for the working class.  The labor movement sociologist Kim 
Scipes argues SMU is “not only a different model of trade unionism but also based on a different 
understanding of the working class and its organization in the struggle to transform society.”4   
In practice, understanding oneself as a political union does not come inherently and a union 
moving towards a SMU model does not happen in a vacuum and usually comes out of a service 
                                                
3 Richard B. Freeman and James L. Medoff, “A New Portrait of U.S. Unionism,” in What Do Unions Do, ed. 
Richard B Freeman et al. (New York, New York: Basic Books Publishers, February 1984) 5 - 6. 
4 Kim Scipes, “Understanding the New Labor Movements in the ‘Third World’: the Emergence of Social Movement 
Unionism.” Critical Sociology 19:2 (1992): 84 
9 
model.  Whether coming from a conscious change in strategy from leadership or from the work 
of a reform caucus, moving to a political union requires a change in understanding of what the 
union does and is and that includes the activating of the rank and file.  That activation of 
membership is one of the other key aspects of a SMU model. 
The rationale behind social movement unionism’s effort to mobilize rank and file 
members can be broken into two reasons.  First, developing rank and file leadership contributes 
to the greater political project of building a stronger working class politics and uses the union as 
a more democratic institution for broader change.  Secondly, strategically activating rank and file 
membership leads to a greater capacity for further organizing and growth of the union. 
Encouraging rank and file members to take ownership of the union through trainings and a real 
system of democracy that promotes membership involvement in key decision-making can 
potentially create an army of rank and file organizers.5  Creating a union of active and trained 
members better prepares unions to effectively win contract campaigns, organize new firms, or 
resist managerial abuse.  In this way, the ideological and strategic components both contribute 
and work together as a process; those wins with rank and file leadership and mass participation 
also shows members the potential power of a collective action in their group’s interest.   
The primary difference between social movement unionism and an organizing or 
community model is the emphasis on significant coalition building and the necessity of this 
pressure in bringing about political change beyond union issues.  Turner and Hurd emphasize the 
merging of two distinct formations (labor movement and a new social movement) to make 
significant changes to current political structures as distinct to SMU.  However, there are not 
                                                
5 Kate Bronfenbrenner and Tom Juravich, “It Takes More Than Housecalls: Organizing to Win with a 
Comprehensive Union-Building Strategy,” in Organizing to Win: New Research on Union Strategies, ed Kate 
Bronfenf et al. (Ithaca, N.Y.: IRL Press, 1998), 35.  
10 
always active social movements, and Hurd and Turner argue that “it is possible to build social 
movement unions in the absence of the broader social movement as many local unions have 
shown, [although] the broader movement more easily sweeps away obstacles and breaks down 
resistance from entrenched office-holders and conservative forces inside and outside of unions.”6   
Turner writes “coalition building is important both for its reformist counter-pressure on 
employers and governments and as an indicator for labor’s shift from special interest group to 
broad partisan for the expansion of democratic voice and participation.”7  Turner then breaks 
down coalition building into three primary types: events - one time affairs or actions; campaigns 
- sustained efforts over a period of time with multiple tactics aimed at a specific goal; and 
institutional consolidation - networks based on previous events/campaigns uniting into new 
organizations for creating future opportunities to further the common politics.8  Events, 
campaigns, and then institutional consolidation are all forms of coalition building and according 
to Turner can operate as a process in escalating commitment to a coalition.  While most unions 
will try to reach out to potentially supportive groups when organizing events, SMU centers the 
coalition building process (even if not consciously following this theory directly) as a major goal 
of the union.  The case studies featured later in this paper all feature various levels of Turner’s 
theory of the process of coalition building.  
Genuine coalition building, especially with a demographic of people rather than 
organization, needs a large group of people willing to build that relationship and therefore a 
dedicated rank and file is necessary for a successful project.  As SMU ideologically organizes 
                                                
6 Turner and Hurd, “Building Social Movement Unionism,” 11. 
7  Lowell Turner, “Globalization and the Logic of Participation: Unions and the Politics of Coalition Building,” 
Journal of Industrial Relations  48(2006): 88 
8  Turner, “Globalization and the Logic of Participation,” 6. 
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around building a working class politics, extending the union’s efforts to a wider population than 
the membership is critical to SMU success. 
This takes slightly different forms in the private sector versus the public sector.  In 
private sector unions this is often seen as an organizing campaign that organizes previously 
unorganized workers, calls for an increase in jobs for people in the surrounding area, or pressures 
for bettering a public service connected to the employer’s corporation.  For example, in 1996, the 
Canadian Auto Workers pushed for a bargaining program that would increase employment 
throughout the country by shortening work time, restricting outsourcing, and guaranteeing job 
levels for the communities in the surrounding communities of plants.9  The bargaining program 
succeeded in rallying support from the working class in the region while also growing union 
membership.  In public sector campaigns the workers will frame their campaign around 
defending or bettering the public services in the local area that working people rely on.  For 
example, 1996 California Nurses’ Association incorporated patient rights into their bargaining 
program after a ballot measure for the same rights had failed in 1996.10  Both private and public 
sector unions can both take a SMU approach and challenge status quo political agendas in 
distinct ways.  Public sector unions can be understood in the context of the ongoing conflict over 
the urban agenda and can be a form of voice for the public interest.11 
Teachers interact intimately with a significant section of the public perhaps more than 
any other public employee profession, making a social movement unionist strategy particularly 
effective from their position.  Teachers generally meet and work with a fairly large number of 
                                                
9 Kim Moody, “Conclusion: Toward an International Social-Movement Unionism,” in Workers in a Lean World: 
Unions in the International Economy, ed. Kim Moody (New York: Verso, 1997), 279. 
10 Moody, “Conclusion: Toward an International Social-Movement Union,” 279. 
11 Paul Johnston, “Peculiarities of the Public Workers’ Movement,” in Success While Others Fail: Social Movement 
Unionism and the Public Workplace, ed. Paul Johnston (Ithaca, NY: ILR Press, 1994), 11. 
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children each year, usually meeting the students’ parents throughout the year, putting them in 
close contact with many people through their profession.  Then within a year, the teacher has an 
entirely new class of students and parents to meet, teach, and work with.  In this way, teachers 
interact with a large percentage of the public on both a personal and professional level, which 
places them in a unique position to form local community partnerships more easily as public 
employees.  Teachers unions have a history of organizing around community institutions; “given 
the fiscal restraints of the late seventies and eighties, teachers’ organizations have had to form 
coalitions in communities, participate in local elections, and press for alliances not just with 
labor organizations but with businessmen and other professionals just to make their needs 
known.”12 
Corporate Education Reform 
 
The wave of teachers reform caucuses pushing a social movement union model comes in 
response to the rise of corporate education reform since the early 2000s and its attack on teachers 
unions and changes to public education.  Corporate education reform is neoliberal education 
reform through federal and state policies that include: “increase test-based evaluation of students, 
teachers, and schools; eliminate or weaken tenure and seniority rights; end pay for experience of 
advanced degrees; close schools deemed low performing and replace them by publicly funded, 
but privately run charters; and replace governance by local school boards with various forms of 
mayoral and state takeover or private management; vouchers and tax credit subsidies for private 
school tuition; and increases in class size, sometimes tied to the firing of the teaching staff.”13  
                                                
12 Marjorie Murphy, Blackboard Unions (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1992) 256. 
13 Valerie Strauss, “A Primer on Corporate School Reform,”  The Washington Post, October 27, 2011, accessed 
April 20th, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/answer-sheet/post/a-primer-on-corporate-school-
reform/2011/10/26/gIQAyWrUKM_blog.html). 
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Corporate education reform is based on the premise that U.S. schools are seriously failing to 
educate students effectively and that the public education system has developed such an 
entrenched bureaucracy it is unsalvageable.  The corporate education reform agenda promotes a 
narrative that the driving forces behind struggling schools are lazy teachers who have become 
comfortable with the status quo of low testing expectations and results, caring more about their 
salary and pensions than education.14  This understanding of why schools are struggling is 
misguided at best and ignores significant research on key factors that dictate educational 
outcomes far more than teacher quality.  This narrative ignores broader and more deeply 
entrenched societal issues that have a far greater impact on educational results, such as poverty, 
de facto segregation and school underfunding.  (Part of the appeal of corporate education reform 
is its blindness to these problems, that would all require a significant restructuring of society and 
current government policies) 
At its most basic, the corporate education reform movement seeks to open up public 
education to markets and justifies this as the only tangible solution to the problem of struggling 
public schools.  However, the privatization of education agenda consists of a multitude of 
policies and developing industries.  This section will go through national policies that have laid 
the groundwork for the movement, follow government policies that open up the privatization 
project and then look at markets and industries that have developed as privatization developed.   
Corporate education reform places an emphasis on making policies based on data driven 
analysis as a measure of educational success.  Corporate education reform seeks to use 
standardized testing as the primary metric of data for determining whether a school is successful 
or not.  Because of the importance of test results to schools’ funding and ability to stay open, 
                                                
14 Diane Ravitch, Reign of Error : The Hoax of the Privatization Movement and the Danger to America’s Public 
Schools, (New York: Albert A. Knopf, 2013), 3. 
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schools have since placed a much higher emphasis on preparation for standardized testing and 
testing itself.   
As teachers, and the unions that support them, are seen as one of the primary groups at 
fault for schools’ inability to increase testing scores in this narrative, corporate education reform 
seeks to connect teachers’ employment more closely to testing results.  It is also worth noting 
that the focus on teachers as the root cause of educational struggle conveniently glosses over 
how educational disparities are clear evidence of the impact of inequality in the United States.  
This agenda uses policies such as attaching teachers’ wages and benefits to test scores (merit 
pay), decreasing barriers to employing people as teachers (not needing teaching certifications to 
work at charters, pushing certification programs that put non-certified people in teaching 
positions such as Teach For America), and weakening/eventually eliminating teachers unions.   
Corporate education reform and other forces to reduce the profession of teaching look to 
limit the teacher’s role as an educator with autonomy, and stress this role as a person teaching 
standardized curriculum who can be replaced easily.  Enforcing core curriculum, standardized 
testing, and limiting teacher’s ability to create curriculum shifts a teaching position towards an 
automated monitor rather than a professional employee whose value as an educator would be 
hard to replace.  Reducing the teacher's role in the classroom to a someone who must teach a 
certain material, a certain way, at a certain pace then removes the value of what a passionate or 
experience teacher could provide to a classroom, and the skill and basis of education that 
teachers unions rely on.  Corporate education reform, while looking to weaken unions 
immediately, also try to reform the teachers role and school system into one more of a 
replaceable worker than a valuable worker, reducing the strength of teacher unions on a more 
macro scale.    
15 
Teachers unions are one of the few groups that actively oppose corporate education 
reform, which often results in defending the status quo.  Corporate reformers have since 
fabricated the myth that there is an inherent inconsistency between the goals of teachers and 
society’s goals for students.  This myth has led to a national trend of politicians, both Republican 
and Democratic, criticizing teachers unions as blockades to education reform, often depicting 
them as greedy institutions protecting bad and lazy teachers at the cost of children's’ education. 
While these are the mechanisms that reduce opposition to corporate education reform and 
justify the movement, actual privatization comes from public schools closings and being 
replaced by charter schools.  No Child Left Behind and Race to the Top widely prescribed 
charter schools as a solution to schools marked as failing with no evidence that they would 
succeed in place of the public school.15  In 1999-2000 there were 1,010 public charters in the 
U.S. and by 2014-2015, there were more than 6,700.1617 
In 2001, No Child Left Behind (NCLB) mandated that all states test all children grades 
three through eight annually in reading and mathematics, and track the data based on student 
demographics.18  By 2014, all students were supposed to score proficient.  If a school was unable 
to raise its scores on track with reaching 100% proficiency, it was labeled a failing school and 
faced increasingly harsh sanctions.  Continuous school failures led to significant restructuring,” 
which could mean firing the entire staff, closing the school, putting it under state management, or 
turning it into a charter.  The goal of 100% proficiency was an impossible goal, with over 80% of 
                                                
15 Ravitch, Reign of Error, 13. 
16  U.S. Department of Education, “Schools and Staffing Survey, 1999 - 2000,” 
https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2002/2002313.pdf (accessed April 20th, 2017) 69. 
17 National Alliance for Public Charter Schools, Estimated Number of Public Charter Schools and Students, 2014-
2015.  Accessed April 20th, 2017, http://www.publiccharters.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/02/open_closed_FINAL.pdf 
18 Ravitch, Reign of Error, 11. 
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schools in the top rated state, Massachusetts, failing to meet the NCLB standards.19  Somewhat 
predictably, the schools that were likeliest to be ranked failing were schools with predominately 
poor and minority student enrollment.20  The nationwide testing project that would designate 
most schools as failing was the first major step in opening up public schools to market forces, as 
it created the need for an alternative to public schools and started the industries of educational 
consulting, charters, and standardized tests. 
Corporate education reform became a bipartisan movement with Barack Obama 
furthering Bush’s national policies with his Race to the Top.  Race to the Top (RTTP) was a 
competition of bettering schools for $5 billion between the states, in which states agreed to 
Common Core State Standards, the expansion of the number of charter schools, the linkage of 
teacher evaluations to student test scores, and the restructuring of their lowest performing 
schools through firing staff or closing the schools.21  The impact of RTTP led to all of the 
changes necessary to open public schools to markets as nearly all states competed for federal 
funding.  RTTP represented both a democratic commitment to corporate education reform and an 
abandonment of the previous core principle that equity should be the driving principle of federal 
aid, since it was based on competition rather than on proportions of students who were poor.22  
These changes purposefully led to the “scale up of entrepreneurial activity, to encourage the 
creation of new markets for both for-profit and nonprofit investors,” according to the director of 
Race to the Top, Joanna Weiss.23  The motivation for public school privatization is driven by 
                                                
19 Ravitch, Reign of Error, 11. 
20 Ravitch, Reign of Error, 11. 
21 Ravitch, Reign of Error,  14. 
22 Ravitch, Reign of Error, 14. 
23 Ravitch, Reign of Error, 15. 
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opening up new markets and the industry of corporate education reform has grown alongside the 
increased implementation of its policies.   
 This paper will not argue that public schools necessarily provide better educations than 
charters as there is so much variance between states, cities, and even districts.  Some charter 
schools certainly provide better educational opportunities than the public schools of their area, 
but part of that comes at the cost of local public schools, as charters tend to have a lower 
percentage of high-need students (this process will be explained further in the LA case study).  
Although charter schools technically cannot deny any student from attending their schools as 
public institutions, in practice many charters have demanding applications that strongly benefit 
those in the most stable family and financial positions to enroll.24  Charter school expansion 
creates a tiered system of public education that exacerbates inequality.  Also, depending on the 
state and other classifications (such as for-profit vs non-profit, etc) charter schools are often not 
held to the same standards or oversight procedures as public schools, such as through 
standardized testing and core curriculum.  This variability in oversight, standards, and local 
enforcement of law results in an inconsistency in charter school education quality.   
It is also important to note that there are stark differences and inequalities in the 
educations that people receive in the United States based on race and class.  Different school 
districts provide “dramatically different learning opportunities - especially disparities in access to 
well-qualified teachers, high quality curriculum, and small schools and classes, [all of which] are 
strongly related to differences in student achievement.”25  These resource disparities between 
                                                
24 Stephanie Simon, “Special Report: Class Struggle - How charter schools get the students they want,” Reuters, 
February 15th, 2013, accessed April 20th, 2017, 
http://mobile.reuters.com/article/idUSBRE91E0HF20130215?irpc=932. 
25 Linda Darling-Hammond, “The Color Line in American Education: Race, Resources, and Student Achievement,” 
The Du Bois Review Vol. 1:2 (2004): 213-246.  Page 213 
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schools is closely linked to race through the legacy of racial redlining and segregation.  In 1998, 
“70% of nation’s Black students attended predominantly minority schools… and more than a 
third of African American and Latino students attended schools with a minority enrollment of 
90%-100%.”26  The schools that are most affected by corporate education reform are the 
underfunded schools with predominantly African-American and Latinx student populations.   
This theory section identified three main features of SMU; an active and involved rank 
and file with democratic voice in the union, a focus on coalition building to achieve collective 
gains, and a political understanding and motivation for pushing the previous two features.  The 
section also explains the mechanisms and driving forces behind the rise in corporate education 
reform.  These theories and explanations should explain and provide context to the two local 
concrete examples of the following case studies and will then be used in the analysis section to 










                                                
26 Linda Darling-Hammond, “The Color Line in American Education: Race, Resources, and Student Achievement,” 
The Du Bois Review Vol. 1:2 (2004): 213-246.  Page 217 
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CHAPTER 2: Chicago Case Study 
Chicago Teachers Union (CTU) became known in the labor movement for its 2012 strike, 
the largest work stoppage in the United States in 2012 that ended with the union opting to go 
back to work after the district offered a better contract.27  CTU’s strike became widely known, 
not just for the size of the stoppage, but as an example of a successfully operating social 
movement union (SMU).  The union quickly transformed from a passive service union to the 
model of a successful social movement union with an active rank and file membership, social 
justice oriented agenda, democratic structure, and strong coalitions with parents and community 
organizations.  Teachers unions across the country have looked to CTU for ways to transform 
their union and CTU has hosted multiple conferences on the subject.  CTU has continued to 
become a more active political force in Chicago and in the battle for public education, running 
close mayoral campaigns in 2014 and leading another successful contract campaign in 2015-
2016.   
It is particularly significant for the transformation and win to have taken place in Chicago 
because the city has the third largest school district in the country and the city’s leadership has 
pushed for corporate education reform since the early 2000’s.28  Chicago has been a testing-
ground for corporate education reform, with a record numbers of school closings accompanying 
charter expansion.29   
                                                
27 Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Profiles of significant collective bargaining disputes of 2012,” Monthly Labor 
Review, May 2013, accessed April 20th, 2017, https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2013/article/profiles-of-significant-
collective-bargaining-disputes-of-2012.htm. 
28 NCES (National Center for Education Statistics), 2010, “Enrollment, poverty, and federal funds for the 100 
largest school districts, by enrollment size,” accessed April 20th, 2017, 
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d12/tables/dt12_104.asp.   
29 NCES (National Center for Education Statistics), “Enrollment, poverty, and federal funds for the 100 largest 
school districts, by enrollment size,” 
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The first section of this case study will provide context of how Chicago Public Schools 
(CPS) developed a large debt crisis and the related corporate education reform implemented in 
the 2000s.  The second section will track the internal politics of CTU, primarily the Caucus of 
Rank and File Educators’ (CORE) growth and transformation of CTU to a social movement 
union through their activism.  The third section will focus on CTU’s strategies in further 
mobilizing rank and file members, building public support, and exerting pressure on the district 
for the 2012 and 2015-2016 contract campaigns. 
Section 1: The Context of Chicago’s Education System 
Chicago has a long history of employing new or untried financial investment devices in 
the name of revitalization.  Chicago has used financial tools such as Tax Increment Financing 
(TIF) and interest rate swaps to try to revitalize areas of Chicago and reduce city debt.  However, 
those risky financial devices have backfired in some sense, leaving the city with a larger debt and 
an underfunded public education system.  To understand the context of Chicago’s public schools, 
this paper will first explain TIF, Chicago’s massive pension debt and misguided attempts to 
reduce it, and how Chicago’s leaders moved towards corporate education reform as a neoliberal 
solution for improving a struggling public school system.  This section will then show the 
subsequent attacks on public schools and teachers unions which were a necessary step to justify 
moving towards a market education system 
 Chicago widely uses Tax Increment Financing (TIF), a tool that freezes the amount of 
money coming from property taxes in a designated location for 15+ years and then uses the 
potential increases in property taxes as a return for private investments in the designated 
location. This practice often results in new private building developments without the necessary 
public services for those who lived in the area prior to TIF.  A district’s frozen property tax base 
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also does not account for inflation, which over more than 15 years has a significant effect on the 
impact of property taxes on state coffers.  Essentially, regardless of how high property values 
and taxes become in a TIF location, that location will pay the same tax rate to the city, with the 
difference between the frozen tax base and actual taxes going to the TIF fund.  As TIF is used 
heavily throughout Chicago, a significant amount of tax revenue for public services stays at the 
same rate it did 15+ years ago, not accounting for inflation, while the difference goes to a 
specific TIF fund.  TIF collects an enormous amount of money, nearly half a billion dollars in 
2015 ($461 million), and has earned around that amount ever year since 2006.30  The growth of 
tax dollars from the frozen base that would go to Chicago Public Schools budget is instead put 
towards the district’s TIF fund, essentially depriving public schools of a large amount of tax 
revenue.  TIF fund usage is fairly opaque to the public, under mayoral control and can be 
distributed relatively at the city’s discretion often to help private investment in the name of 
revitalization, such as using $55 million to help finance a basketball stadium for DePaul 
University.31   
In addition to dealing with the impact of how TIF withholds tax revenue from CPS, CPS 
and Chicago made a series of poor policy decisions in 1995 in an attempt to remedy a failing 
school system, leading to a massive pension debt that has only worsened.  In 1979, CPS was 
failing and unable to pay their teachers and as a response they created the Chicago School 
Finance Authority to oversee budgeting.  Nearly two years later, CPS and CTU negotiated a deal 
where CPS paid 98% of teachers pension costs in exchange for lower pay raises (Chicago 
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teachers also do not receive social security - their pensions are their entire retirement plans32).   
  In 1995, Chicago’s education system was seen as a national failure and the then governor 
of Illinois put Chicago’s schools under the control of then Mayor Richard Daley - creating a 
mayoral control of Chicago’s education system through the appointment of a school board and 
chief executive officer (superintendent) that has continued until the present day (2017).  In 
addition to creating mayoral control of Chicago public school education, the law also ruled that 
class size, district or school restructuring, and the creation of new charters were no longer 
mandatory and all optional for CPS to bargain over as part of any future negotiations with 
CTU33.  
Daley and the legislature allowed the district to skip their pension fund payments from 
1996 to 2005, diverting property tax dollars that were initially allocated for the pension fund into 
paying for the failing schools’ operation.  The deferral of pension payments was part of a larger 
project of CPS to build schools and better the education system that involved borrowing large 
sums with mostly fixed interest rate bonds.34  While it did improve the schools by providing 
some funding, the deferral also led to a massive growth in unpaid pension debt as more teachers 
entered the system and the fund did not grow; the pension fund estimates that the district should 
have contributed $2 billion over that period.  Teacher’s pensions were not the only pension 
payments were skipped.   Chicago’s pension debt also includes that of other public sector 
workers’ (such as police and firefighters) pensions.   
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In the early 2000s, Chicago looked to financial derivatives rather than issuing municipal 
bonds to address the shortfall and the district sold $1 billion of auction-rate securities from 2003 
to 2007, nearly all of which were tied to interest-rate swaps.35  The auction-rate securities rely on 
investors bidding on the securities.  Once a bid is won, that investor holds onto the security for a 
set period of time until up for auction again.  Borrowing on floating interest rates/issuing floating 
rate bonds offer interest rates that are dependent on market rates rather than a fixed amount.  
Interest rate swaps are a financial derivative instrument that means a party exchanges a floating 
rate for a fixed amount.  In the case of CPS, it would receive payments from an investment bank 
based on a common floating market rate in return for making payments to the bank on a fixed 
rate.   
CPS financial advisors accepted the push for floating rate bonds and interest rate swaps 
because they thought it could lead to paying off more debt and saving money on interest costs.  
However,  just as the district could potentially save more money than with the stable fixed 
interest rate borrowing, they could also potentially lose far more in the event of a market crash.  
In addition to the risky decision making from CPS officials to use the interest-rate swap 
instrument, there have also been some accusations from the Chicago Tribune that CPS’s 
financial advisors’ made poor models that inaccurately represented actual payoff and risk 
analysis, thereby downplaying the risk. 
After the financial crisis of 2008, Chicago’s swaps and debt grew massively as banks 
decided to stop supporting the auctions (a number of banks had previously submitted support 
bids to keep interest rates down and prevent auction failure) and as a result market floating rates 
skyrocketed36.  CPS took a serious gamble on attempting to pay off a large debt with exotic 
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financial instruments, but the higher risk took its toll and, instead, CPS faced a higher debt with 
worsening interest rates. 
From 2003 to 2008, CPS’s variable-rate debt had multiplied six times over and by 2008 
$1.8 billion in bonds (40% of district’s outstanding debt) were subject to fluctuating rates, 
whereas in 2003 it had been just $300 million (10% of debt).37  The Chicago Tribune estimated 
that over the course of the deals, due to interest rate swaps the district will pay $100 million 
more than it would have on fixed-rate bonds. 
In 2016, Chicago was failing to address the debt effectively under Mayor Rahm Emanuel 
and Moody’s dropped the debts credit rating to junk status, and while other ratings firms did not 
follow Moody’s, the impact of their drop is still significant.  The problem of the debt only 
worsens as the lower ratings will lead to higher interest rates on current and future debt, making 
it harder to pay off the debt the longer it exists.  As of 2016, CPS owes more than $6 billion to its 
bondholders and the teacher’s retirement fund is about $9.6 billion short.38  Chicago is in a 
general debt crisis, with their property tax backed city debt at about $9.4 billion at the end of 
2015.39 
In addition to the pension debt stress on CPS budget, student enrollment has dropped 
significantly in Chicago in the past ten years, from 413,694 in 2006-2007 to 392,285 in 2015-
2016. 40 As will be discussed in the later case study of LA, a declining student enrollment 
reduces district funding from the state and then individual funding for schools that have the 
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highest enrollment decline.  Losing about 5% of student enrollment over almost ten years led to a 
state revenue decrease of 11.4% ( $180 million dollars) to CPS in 2015-2016.41  
This trend of private investment of public money and spaces in Chicago has continued 
more directly into other aspects of education policy.  Due to a series of policy decision from CPS 
and Chicago government, CPS became further underfunded from TIF while accumulating a 
massive amount of debt through their pension debt obligations (even prior to interest rate swaps).  
When faced with the opportunity of implementing corporate education reform and opening 
public education to market forces rather than attempting to fix the highly institutionalized and 
struggling public schools, CPS and the mayor chose corporate education reform.  The schools 
were struggling in part because of a legacy of mayoral irresponsibility.  Privatizing education 
diffuses responsibility for struggling schools into the obscure language of market forces and free 
choice, in some ways absolving government responsibility while allowing the mayor to keep the 
TIF funds at their discretion.  A worsening public education system actually helps an expanding 
corporate education reform policy, as it provides justification for the shift to a privatized school 
system. 
Since 2004, Chicago Public Schools’ School Board (CPS) has closed large numbers of 
public schools in order to create charter schools, which are often investment opportunities.  This 
rollout of corporate education reform also serves the project of weakening and shrinking public 
teachers unions - one of the few opponents of that very kind of corporate reform. 
Beginning in 2004, Mayor Daley began the “Renaissance 2010” plan that called for 
school closings and ‘turnarounds’ (called reconstitution in LA) - the whole staff of a school is 
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fired and must reapply for their jobs - for schools on the grounds they were failing.42  Between 
2001 and 2010, 70 Chicago Public Schools were closed and 6,000 union jobs disappeared (about 
20% of the union membership).  The closed schools were replaced with publicly funded non-
union charters.43   In 2013 alone, the Chicago Board of Education shut down 49 public schools 
which was “the largest mass school closure in U.S. history.”44  CPS then promptly released a 
document asking for charter schools to apply in the city, specifically in eleven neighborhoods 
with overcrowded schools.45  Although the closing of these public schools is more complex and 
due to more factors than simply the desire to form charter schools for investment, the decision to 
respond to failing schools with inadequate funding by closing them is also supportive of the 
trend towards corporate education reform sought in Chicago. 
In 2011, Illinois’s General Assembly passed SB7, an education reform bill heavily 
influenced by Stand for Children and Advance Illinois, education reform advocacy groups that 
push corporate reform policies, and endorsed by Emanuel.46  The bill was initially written with 
negotiations from CTU and with CTU support, but the sponsors of the bill added in union-
busting measures that would limit CTU’s strike power just before sending the bill to the general 
assembly, giving CTU little time to re-negotiate the bill, and this resulted in CTU rescinding 
their support but the bill still passed.   
                                                
42 Bradbury, et al., How to Jump Start your Union, 10 
43 Bradbury, et al., How to Jump Start your Union, 11 
44 Sameen Amin, “School Debate Threatens Rahm Emanuel’s Re-election,” Aljazeera America, March 27, 2015, 
accessed April 20th, 2017.  http://america.aljazeera.com/watch/shows/america-tonight/articles/2015/3/27/rahm-
emanuel-chuy-garcia-chicago-runoff-schools.html 
45 Rebecca Klein, “Chicago Requests More Charter Schools After Massive Wave of Public School Closings,” 
HuffingtoPost, August 15, 2013, accessed April 20th, 2017.  http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/15/chicago-
charter-schools_n_3757911.html 
46 Matthew Blake, “The Union Cannot Strike in Chicago: SB7 and The CTU Strike,” Progress Illinois, September 
13th, 2012, accessed April 20th, 2017.  http://progressillinois.com/posts/content/2012/09/13/union-cannot-strike-
chicago-sb7-and-teachers-strike 
27 
Summarized impacts of SB7: 
● Rather than needing a majority of voting members to sign on to allow a strike like all 
other teachers’ unions in Illinois, CTU would need 75% of all covered employees to vote 
yes to authorize a strike.47 
● Fact-finding report would be released 100 days after stalled negotiations48 
● There would then be a 90-day cooling off period if both sides rejected the report.49 
● The bill would “prevent CTU from filing unfair labor practice charges, and strip state 
authority from mediators and factfinders.”50 
● The bill would further develop the Performance Evaluation and Reform Act (PERA) and 
make teacher salary and personnel decisions based on performance based evaluations, 
with seniority and additional education only considered secondarily.   
● The PERA development included an increase in performance evaluations, leaving the 
decision of evaluation ambiguous (potentially through standardized testing). 
● The bill increased new teacher probation from two years to four years.51 
● The bill shifted negotiations over the length of school day and school year to permissible 
issues, meaning that they could be on the bargaining table only if the educational 
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employer decided to allow it on the table, effectively allowing the Chicago school board 
to unilaterally implement a longer school day.52 
 
SB7 changed collective bargaining laws for CTU, limiting their ability to strike and thus 
their potential strength, as well as making changes to teacher pay systems and potential job 
security.  One key aspect of SB7 is the change that the school board can unilaterally increase the 
length of the school day.  This later resulted in Emanuel and the school board mandating a 20% 
increase in school day without a pay increase as a part of CTU’s new contract, one of the driving 
proposed contract changes contributing to CTU’s mobilization.  CPS argued that lengthening the 
school day would give students more time in class and would help students in Chicago’s schools.  
In addition to significantly adding to teacher workload without compensation, CTU argued that 
the proposal was a band-aid solution to education that did not address the more deep-seeded 
funding disparities and school issues.  CTU instead argued to only increase the school day with 
additional funding for the arts, physical education and other necessary parts of education that are 
under-funded in Chicago.   
The effects of SB7 can be seen as tangible changes limiting union power and 
implementing changes in opposition to union goals, but also as an example of the trend of bi-
partisan support for corporate education reform, with both major political parties pushing against 
teachers unions in Chicago.  
CTU’s contract with the Chicago Public Schools (CPS) was set to end in 2012.  
Following SB7’s changes to Chicago schools and CTU’s collective bargaining ability, 
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Emanuel’s school board put forward a new contract proposal for 2012 to 2015 proposing fierce 
changes to teachers jobs and the school systems.   
 
Changes from the 2007 contract to CPS’s proposed 2012 contract: 
● One of the biggest changes proposed was an 20% increase in the length of the school day 
without increased compensation to account for the extra work.53 
● A change in teacher evaluation to yearly evaluations dependent on student’s standardized 
test results.54 
● A change from layoffs being done based on seniority to teacher performance evaluations 
(as Chicago had been and continues to close record numbers of public schools per year, 
teacher layoff transferring has a large impact on job security).55 
● An elimination of the enhanced pension program.56 
 
In June 2010, CPS CEO called for CTU to accept 2,000 layoffs or open their contract to 
give up all or part of the members’ 4% annual raise due to financial crisis.57  After CTU refused 
to open the contract to negotiations and demanded that CPS explain the financial crisis and 
budget failure, CPS laid off nearly 1,300 teachers.58 
CPS faced a growing debt crisis after the 2008 recession that continued to escalate until 
the current day (2017).  As so much of the debt was in unpaid pensions and the retirement 
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system for teachers, one of CPS’s solutions for addressing the budget crisis was to weaken the 
teachers union.  This was both a general cost cutting measure and a means of limiting their 
ability to resist changes to their pensions, one of the largest amounts of CPS debt.  SB7 was 
passed and challenged teachers unions in Chicago specifically.  SB7 and CPS’s contract proposal 
were large tangible steps towards creating a corporate education system, both immediately 
affecting teachers’ livelihood and day-to-day work.  At the same time as these pension debts 
grow, and Chicago as a whole sinks further into debt, CPS has undergone significant enrollment 
decline and is forced to work with reduced state funding.  Meanwhile, Chicago has been 
collecting massive amounts of revenue through property taxes that could have been going to CPS 
but instead were going to a TIF fund mostly under the control of the mayor.  In response to this 
mounting financial crisis, the attack on public schools and teachers unions and the rollout of 













Section 2: Internal Union Politics and the Development of CORE 
This section will first track CORE’s growth and strategy as an activist group and caucus 
from 2008 to the 2010 union elections.  Although this section is not focused on strategy, it 
includes a description of many of CORE’s actions because after they were elected, these 
strategies and ideas shifted CTU policy and led to the caucus’s electoral success.  In the 2010 
CTU elections, the top four positions, nine other citywide offices, and all elementary and high 
school vice presidencies changed from the incumbents of the United Progressive Caucus (UPC) 
to members of the Caucus of Rank and File Educators (CORE).  UPC had gone through waves of 
militancy over their 37 years leading the union during the past 40 years (there was a brief 3-year 
period of an unsuccessful reform slate), despite these waves of militancy, they became a service 
union that did not actively fight corporate education reform.59  CORE originally formed in 2005 
as an activist group to stop school closings, but ended up running a reform slate out of frustration 
with CTU’s lack of financial transparency and failure to actively fight against school closings 
and other corporate education policies changes.60   
CORE began in 2005 as groups of teachers who partnered with the Kenwood Oakland 
Community Organization (KOCO) to protest school closings in the Bronzeville area of Chicago, 
a predominantly poor and African-American area.  In 2008, after fighting individual closings for 
three years, the small group began to organize as a caucus, forming a study group that looked at 
corporate education reform projects in other cities, CTU history, social movement unionism, and 
their contract.61  They criticized the UPC leadership, demanding transparency on the union’s 
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budget while simultaneously working to stop school closings by CPS by going to every school 
board meeting and closure hearing.   
CORE’s grassroots strategy took a variety of avenues of applying pressure on CPS for 
their goals.  Through their earlier activism, CORE had previous alliances and coalitions with 
community organizations to oppose corporate education reform, demanding that the school board 
stop all school closings and turnarounds and reduce class sizes in certain over packed schools 
serving predominantly working-class people of color.  For example, CORE developed early a 
working relationship with Grassroots Education Movement (GEM - a group of parents and 
community organizations that work against schools closing and turnarounds), working on 
specific issues (primarily school closures) that they believed the union should be fighting.  They 
did so without union resources. 
 In January 2009, CORE organized a city-wide public hearing on how they should best 
organize to stop 20 school closings and 12 turnarounds (a policy that fires all teachers at the 
school and forces them to reapply for their jobs).  This was “attended by more than 500 students, 
parents, community members, and teachers representing 81 schools.”62  In February 2009, CORE 
organized with GEM to march on the school board’s meeting, then camped outside the district’s 
downtown offices in tents overnight, with hundreds protesting inside the school board meeting 
and outside the building.  The action succeeded in preventing six of the proposed 22 school 
closures. 63   
CORE also tried to exert pressure through labor law, and in June 2009 CORE filed an 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission complaint that turnarounds (or reconstitutions) 
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have a disproportionate impact on African American Teachers in CPS.64  Although CORE didn’t 
win the complaint, the action served as another example that demonstrated how an active and 
differently minded leadership could run CTU to better protect union members and more broadly, 
Chicago education. 
In addition to community organizing campaigns and public protests, CORE also sought 
power over Chicago’s executive branch through the courts.  In May 2010, Jackson Pottery, a 
teacher and co-chair of CORE sued CPS over a failure in transparency based on the results of 
research on the turnaround program, how Tax Increment Financing money is being used, and on 
other general unanswered city budget questions.65 
By doing the work they wanted CTU to do, fighting school closings, working with 
community and parent organizations, and actively resisting attacks on teachers, CORE organized 
a base of activists with a coherent understanding of what they imagined CTU could do.  This 
activism positioned the caucus well to run a reform slate against the incumbents who had been 
accused of careless spending, apathy, and accepting of corporate education reform.   
CORE entered union elections as a caucus at the lowest level, first running elections in 
CTU’s 800 member house of delegates in early 2009 (there is at least one delegate from every 
school, more from larger schools).66  The caucus quickly made the 20 member minimum 
necessary to propose actions to the floor of the house, but often faced opposition from CTU’s 
leadership in proposing new business.  CORE’s next larger electoral push was to run two 
teachers who had been researching and publicizing CTU’s pension planning failures as 
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candidates for the board of CTU’s pension fund.  This campaign functioned as a primer for the 
future elections by familiarizing teachers in schools with CORE’s ideas of a more democratic 
and actively fighting union.  The two teachers, Lois Ashford and Jay Rehak, took a “a tour of the 
Chicago Public Schools, speaking to teachers about their concerns over the security of their 
pensions,” while distributing literature about the pensions.67  CORE also kept an up-to-date 
website on Ashford’s and Rehak’s research into the pension planning, while Ashford and Rehak 
publicly chastised Ron Huberman (CPS’s CEO) for attempting to cut pension payments.  In 
October 2009, Ashford and Rehak were elected to the pension fund board of trustees. 
As the election developed, CORE organized protests outside of CTU headquarters, citing 
their research of the mismanagement of the pensions funds.  This election strategy had 
mobilization implications for both CORE’s takeover of CTU and the 2012 strike.  Firstly, the 
election campaign showed inactive teachers that there was an organization of teachers fighting 
corporate education policy, as well as demonstrating how CTU’s leadership and the union itself 
had previously failed.  By exposing CTU’s mismanagement and lack of action, CORE showed 
that there had been a failure of agency to oppose structural changes, rather than insurmountable 
external barriers.  The election campaign also served as an educational campaign teaching 
members about the dangers of pension mismanagement and assaults on public employee 
pensions, potentially activating them in further recognizing attacks on teachers and public 
education.  Finally, the campaign introduced CORE as a caucus looking to make a more active 
and democratic union by reaching out to individual teachers at their schools to join CORE.   
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In CORE’s 2010 election campaign for top CTU positions, CORE ran as the only caucus 
willing to re-open their contract with CPS, arguing for actively fighting change versus slowly 
losing their benefits.  Jesse Sharkey, CORE member and CTU vice president said, "What the 
union had been doing wasn't working, teachers know the power of our union is in decline. And 
while we can't guarantee that we'll win this fight we're facing, we can guarantee that we'll lose if 
we don't try.”68   
CORE ran a decentralized grassroots campaign  that had about eighty to a hundred CORE 
member activists visiting schools where they would talk to teachers in parking lots and inside 
schools, then leave flyers in the teachers’ mailboxes.69  The caucus broke up the district’s 
schools geographically with a detailed google document that all members had access to in order 
to ensure that every school was included, with most schools being visited more than three 
times.70  CORE also phone banked members, created a website and also a newsletter to get their 
name out.  CORE paid for the campaign with official caucus member dues ($35 for teachers, $20 
for paraprofessionals, retirees, and supporters), fundraisers with other unions and events (such as 
AFSCME locals and Labor Notes), and through slate candidates putting their own money 
towards the campaign.   
While running their election campaign, CORE also continued to fight school closings, 
through attending every board meeting, camping outside of schools proposed for closures, and 
organizing rallies.  In February 2010, CPS ended up keeping six of eight proposed school 
closings open after CORE’s protests (that included three aldermen testifying with CORE).71  
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CORE’s activism essentially was their campaign - as one member said “they didn’t say ‘Elect 
me and I’ll do this.’ They said ‘This is what we’ve been doing and we’ll keep doing it.’”72 
In the midst of union elections, CPS CEO Huberman announced a projected $900 million 
budget deficit and called to reduce that deficit through reducing teachers’ pensions, raises, and 
increasing class sizes.  CORE in response called for more financial transparency from the district 
and offered an alternative funding solution through using TIF funds, and cutting executive 
funding and bureaucracies.   
Three different opposition slates ran for the 2010 elections, with the incumbent United 
Progressive Caucus getting 36%, CORE getting 31% and the other three challenger slates 
splitting the other 31%.73  In the runoff, all other slates supported CORE and the top four officer 
positions won with 59% in favor with 76% of members voting.74  The slate also won the other 
nine citywide positions, all six vice-presidencies for high schools, and seventeen elementary 
schools.  The Caucus had control of the union.75 
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Section 3:  Internal Power Building/Union Reform Efforts and External Pressure 
The section will focus on CTU’s internal organization of teachers and school workers and 
the following section will discuss CTU’s coalition building with non-union groups.  CTU began 
organizing teachers for a potential strike over contract negotiations during the summer of 2012 
(CTU went to strike that September).  During this time, CTU created an organizing department 
filled with staff organizers who had previously been teachers or paraprofessionals within 
Chicago public schools.  Their job was to keep teachers active and up to date on bargaining 
developments and CTU action plans, with each organizer responsible for 100 schools in regional 
clusters.76  CORE’s organizing turned CTU into a highly democratic union by working to engage 
teachers and school workers in action planning, keeping them up to date on bargaining and 
developing their demands with heavy rank and file membership influence.   
CTU formed Contract Action Committees in each school (over 600 total), in which each 
committee member “was responsible for communicating with about 10 employees face-to-face, 
including teachers and paraprofessionals, as well as the engineers, security staff, and lunchroom 
workers in other unions.”77  These Action committees allowed CTU to quickly disperse 
information, letters, and petitions to not just teachers, but other allies as well, such as other union 
members and parents.  By getting teachers to participate as local organizers, dedicating their time 
to updating and organizing their fellow school workers, CTU effectively made them further 
invested in union activity, and created a sense of solidarity among those workers at the school.  
CTU developed bargaining demands through a process of getting each of 28 existing member 
committees to discuss and develop a list of demands that were then compiled and finalized by a 
                                                




central committee with rank-and-file involvement.78  Creating a democratic system for 
developing demands is important for creating demands best suited to all members, but also in 
continuing to cultivate feelings of solidarity with one another as all participate in decision 
making rather than decisions being made by a distant leadership.   
By having an active union base, CTU had more person-power to try to organize and 
activate more members and ran a phone banking campaign with trained members reaching out to 
the new, least-protected, and lowest-paid members.  The calls consisted of discussing board 
policies and how to put forward union goals, ending the conversation by asking members to get  
more actively involved, through attending actions or joining an action committee.79   
CTU’s bargaining team consisted of “30 members drawn from all sectors, seniority 
ranges, job categories, and caucuses … which worked well to create buy-in and cooperation.”80  
CTU’s internal organizing tactics focused on building a more democratic union for ideological 
reasons as well as strategical reasons, such as developing a larger group of teachers actively 
working on CTU’s campaign, creating union buy-in, and in general developing a sense of 
solidarity among teachers and school workers.  This resulted in 88% of total members voting to 
strike, with 96% of members participating in the vote.81 
 As discussed earlier in this paper, parental support can play a key role in a teachers’ 
strike as it not only breaks the myth that teachers’ unions demands hurt students education, but 
also provides non-employee public pressure on elected officials. Prior to the strike, CORE - 
through CTU - had been working with parent groups to protest schools closing through working 
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with groups like GEM, but began wider support efforts for the strike.  Action committee 
members were active in local school council meetings and circulated a petition among parents 
that said “If we are going to have a longer school day, it must be a better school day, with a rich 
curriculum, more social workers and counselors, and high quality facilities.”82   
Much of the union’s efforts towards winning over parents came through educational 
campaigns, one of which came from informational picket lines when a third of Chicago’s schools 
opened early.83  The mock picket lines also served to educate members on running a picket line.  
The education campaign needed to convince parents and the public that addressing the massive 
school budget deficit did not need to come at the expense of teachers and that Chicago could 
change its budget policies to focus more on education.  CTU released a 45 page report on 
Chicago public schools with data showing how schools could be more equally funded to avoid 
the racial educational disparities and questioning Chicago’s use of TIF (specifically where the 
money that would otherwise be going to schools, was going).  The report was also simplified into 
one page reports in English and Spanish that were distributed at every opportunity possible.  
Most public actions included parents and community members protesting alongside teachers, 
often using confrontational action methods.  For example they “disrupted and took over a board 
meeting; parents and community activists occupied a school; and community organizations led a 
vigil outside the Mayor’s home.”84  CTU’s efforts in organizing parents proved successful, as 
their strategy (in addition to the structural factors many parents already disliked) led to a poll 
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showing 66% of public school parents supporting the strike and less than 31% disapproving of 
the strike.85 
 CTU went to strike on September 10th, 2012 after negotiations between CTU and CPS 
fell through.  CTU overcame some of the striking provisions set out by SB7 with a massive vote 
to strike that well exceeded the new 75% threshold required to strike, and demanding that issues 
that SB7 took off the bargaining table should be negotiated.  The strike lasted until September 
18th, after Emanuel sought an injunction against the teachers which was denied, and CTU 
members voted to suspend the strike in favor of a 3 year contract.  During the strike, teachers, 
parents, and students ran picket lines outside Chicago’s schools.  The 3 year contract included 
compromises from both sides, resulting in a 3% salary increase for the first year, a 2% increase 
for each subsequent year, and a 4% increase to extend the contract an additional year at the end 
of the contract; 30% of teacher evaluations based on standardized test scores down from 45%; 
50% of new teaching positions to be filled by displaced teachers from school closings; and a 7 
hour and 15 minute school day - down from the proposed 7 hour and 45 minute increase.86   
 The contract represents some wins over corporate education as well as some 
compromises for CTU.  The reduction of the proposed 20% increased school day to a 13% 
increase is significant because due to SB7, school day length was an issue that was not 
necessarily on the bargaining table, and that CPS could choose whether or not to include it.  
Pushing to negotiate school day length down from the proposed 20% demonstrated union 
strength for both union members and CPS, as well as to parents and the wider public that even 
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SB7 non-negotiable issues could be included on the bargaining table.  The reduction in the 
importance of standardized testing evaluation is one of the more important wins for CTU, as it 
reduces corporate education reform’s agenda of devaluing teachers and the general shift to a data 
driven and standardized test focused education.  Although reducing the importance of 
standardized testing for teacher evaluations does not seriously address, or remedy, Chicago’s 
trend of closing public schools, it does generally reduce their importance as an institutional value 
system, as testing scores currently act as a driving justification for school closings.   
Creating a pool of displaced teachers to be rehired at a certain quota to opening school 
positions creates some degree of job security in response to the great number of school closings.  
As part of the incentive for removing tenure and opening new charter schools lies in the lower  
cost of new teacher salaries, this change also fights corporate education trends, as it also works 
against devaluing the experience and the profession of teachers.  The non-wage benefits was a 
bigger bone of contention in these negotiations than salary increases, and CTU and CPS both 
compromised and found middle ground on wage increases.   
Despite CTU’s wins and their decision to return to work after a week, rather than a forced 
end to the strike, CTU failed in their larger school reform demands that played a fairly central 
role in their campaign.  These demands were facing more structural opposition than the teacher 
benefit and evaluation demands because they were not necessarily on the bargaining table and 
CPS had to choose to include them in negotiations.  Their demands included smaller class sizes 
and class size caps, a richer curriculum in underfunded schools, and increased funding for music, 
visual art, and physical education.  Had the negotiations gone to mediation, these demands would 
not have been recognized as they are not economic issues the teachers have bargaining 
jurisdiction over.  CTU publicized these demands as some of their top bargaining issues, but 
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were unable to force CPS to negotiate on serious education reform policies.  In this way, CTU 
functioned as an institutional voice of power for parents and students who were frustrated with 
bipartisan pushes for corporate education reform. 
 Despite their failure to push through lasting education reform with their strike, CTU has 
since taken action through other strategies to act as an institutional mechanism for a democratic 
voice.  Specifically, CTU collaborated with SEIU Illinois, Action Now, and other community 
organizations to form United Working Families, an independent political organization formed 
“to create a progressive, pro-labor, political infrastructure to challenge the mayor’s pro-business 
agenda.”87  Unable to push forward serious education reform through strike bargaining, CTU 
helped form and play a big role in continuing to organize for mayoral and city council election 
campaigns, realizing that other avenues of organizing could better achieve education reform.   
CTU put forward Jesus ‘Chuy’ Garcia as their candidate, whose campaign focused on 
ending school closings, stopping the development of charter schools, bringing back an elected 
rather than mayoral appointed school board, and reforming Chicago’s TIF system.88  Electoral 
grassroots organizing continued out of CTU’s 2012 strike mobilization and Emanuel received 
less than the majority of Chicago’s vote, leading to a runoff election, the first in 25 years.  
Emanuel eventually won the 2015 mayorship, receiving 55% of the vote versus Garcia’s 44%, 
but CTU’s candidate and previous CTU member and teacher for city council Susan Sadlowski 
Garza was elected in her district.89  Since her election, Garza headed a city council ordinance 
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(Garza-Cardenas TIF ordinance) that would directly put $200 million of TIF surplus into public 
schools, with 40 of the 50 Aldermen publicly supporting it.90  
2015-2016 Contract Campaign 
Negotiations for the 2015 contract began in 2014 as the 2012 contract would expire in 
early 2015.  Emanuel and the school board looked at the contract as an opportunity to reduce 
their growing pension debt and proposed phasing out the current pension pickup.  The district 
paid 7% of the members’ pension payments since the 1987 contract where pension pickup was 
agreed upon instead of salary increases.91  CPS also looked to cut $51 million each year in 
healthcare from members to reduce costs and debt.  CTU wanted to use their voice to push more 
policy changes within CPS, including increasing school funding, capping charter school growth, 
and diverting money from the city’s TIF fund to public education.  In addition to school policy 
changes, the union also sought to defend against attacks on member’s healthcare, pensions, and 
wage increases.  Negotiations between the district and CTU lasted until the last bargaining day 
before a possible strike, when CTU’s negotiating team endorsed the proposed contract 
agreement.  The membership then approved the deal with over 70% of the voting members in 
favor of the deal.92 
The contract campaign was a much more straightforward fight than the 2012 contract 
battle because the union’s social movement strategy and power had been building since the 
caucus took control in 2010.  The campaign focused its strategy around the threat of another 
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strike and building public support for the union’s demands to back up the strike.  Public opinion 
plays a large role in determining public sector unions’ strike success.  As the union is negotiating 
primarily with elected officials, or at least bureaucrats beneath elected officials instead of 
businesses, constituent support will affect the official’s response to the strike.  Unlike striking 
against a business, in which withholding labor reduces profits for the employer, for most public 
sector unions, it is the public that suffers from strikes.  Therefore, the strike’s power is primarily 
of a political rather than economic nature; it will cost the district money to have students out of 
schools, but without public support the strike risks villainizing the union. 
CTU threatened a strike three times throughout the bargaining process, once a mock 
strike vote, then a vote and proposed one-day strike, then waiting till late in the bargaining 
process for another proposed agreement and holding rallies during negotiations to show a 
preparedness to strike.  In the winter of 2015, CTU conducted mock votes to strike again, with 
88% of all members voting to strike, 96% out of the 92% voting members.93  Although fairly 
early in the bargaining process, the mock vote served an internal function as well as an external 
pressure function.  Internally, the vote gages membership sentiments on a potential strike for the 
leadership and in the case of the highly militant CTU, readies members and primes them for a 
strike.  Externally, the vote acts as a display of strength, showing the district that the union 
membership is very willing to go on strike.   
From June 2015 forward CTU was operating and negotiating without a contract and in 
early Spring 2016, CPS announced they were planning on stopping payment on the 7% pension 
pickup entirely as part of a plan  - essentially cutting salaries by 7% and creating a policy forcing 
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members to pay for their entire retirement (members receive no social security, only their 
pension payment).94  CTU organized a one day strike for April 1st in response to this threat 
arguing that the district would break labor law by doing so, validating their strike prior to a fact-
finding period (a strike otherwise would be illegal).  The district argued that the strike would 
violate labor law and that they were operating legally by cutting pension payments.  After the 
threat, the district loosened their terms and decided against cutting the payments, leaving it for 
future contract negotiations.  The union saw this as a win, and held a walk-out and rally 
downtown, forcing CPS to hold 250 contingency sites for students (child monitoring centers).95 
The one-day strike strategy has the same basic impact as the mock strike vote, but 
amplified.  The strike should prepare and activate rank and file members for a potentially longer 
strike and provide leadership with an opportunity to organize a strike.  Similar to CTU’s 2012 
mock picket-lines, practicing striking can lead to a more effective eventual strike.  Externally, 
the one-day strike both demonstrates to the district the union’s willingness to strike and adds 
militancy to their demands.  However, unlike the mock vote, the one-day strike has concrete 
financial and political impacts on the district, forcing them to organize contingency sites and deal 
with a large protest.  
CTU used the threat of a strike effectively enough to avoid needing to follow through 
with their threat, however that came from confidence in their ability to strike and that public 
opinion would support that strike.  Most of CTU’s building of support for their strike came from 
earlier organizing around school closings, mayoral campaign organizing, and connecting their 
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contract battle to frustration with the mayor and city’s use of TIF funds.  By focusing on TIF and 
linking it to the underfunding of education allowed CTU to gain more public support for their 
contract campaign, as it included demands around those issues.  Actions of public support 
culminated with a series of rallies in the last week of negotiations before the potential strike.  The 
union organized a press conference with community organizations, aldermen, and state 
legislators that demanded Emanuel “free the funds” to settle the contract.96  During the same 
week, teachers and parents continued to hold ‘walk ins’ and morning pickets around the city.97  
On the last day of negotiations, the union organized a parent and student picket outside of the 
mayor’s house, and a strike headquarters for teachers for painting banners and assembling picket 
signs.  However the final strike was unnecessary; the negotiating team strongly endorsed a last 
minute contract agreement that was later ratified by the membership.   
 CTU saw the contract campaign as a victory, successfully limiting health care cost 
increases, defending the pension pickup for current members with a fair raise to compensate for 
no pension pickup for new hires, and pushing a series of district policy changes to better schools 
in Chicago (including capping charters, a temporary ban on school closings, and increasing 
funding for education).  However, some of those wins, specifically around pay and benefits were  
still mostly defensive, fighting off aggressive changes to their pension, healthcare, and pay 
structure.  Also, as the district still has an enrollment decline, the union continues to face the 
threat of large layoffs, but the contract’s cap on charter schools and new layoff policy should 
help.  1000 employees were laid off right before the 2016 school year (500 union members), and 
then 237 teachers were laid off two weeks before the strike deadline and the union was unable to 
regain those jobs.  Many of these positions were in special education, leading to some schools 
                                                
96 Winslow, “Chicago Teachers Avert Strike Forcing Mayor to Dig Deep.” 
97 Winslow, “Chicago Teachers Avert Strike Forcing Mayor to Dig Deep.” 
47 
failing to meet federally mandated individualized education plans for students with disabilities, 
and one failure of the contract was in addressing the special education cuts.98  While the contract 
agreement succeeded in defending teacher's pay and benefits, the most exciting wins came from 
their district policy changes. 
The following section will summarize the 2016 contract wins, first covering pay, 
benefits, and working conditions, then the district policy changes.  The chart below compares  
CPS’s original contract proposal and the final contract agreement.  In addition to these changes, 
the contract included two important working condition changes for specific groups.  First, three 
additional professional development days and two additional 15-minutes preparation blocks per 
week for elementary school teachers.99  Second, teachers who teach subjects, such as Art and 
Music, that are not covered by standardized tests will not be evaluated based on those tests.100   
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Pay and Benefits compared in the proposed contract versus final contract 
Issue CPS proposed (and rejected) 
contract 
Final contract 
7% Pension pickup Eliminated for all teachers Remains for current teachers, all 
new hires after Jan 1st, 2017 
would get two raises totaling 7% 
Raises 8.75% increase over 4 years 2018 (2.0%) 
2019 (2.5%) 
(no retroactive pay raises from 
2015-2016, or 2016-2017) 
Steps and Lanes  Eliminating pay structure Remains unchanged 
Charter Schools Capping Charters at 127 Capping Charters at 127 
Health Insurance Teacher contributions increase 
by 1.5% 
Teachers contributions increase 
by 0.8% 
Layoffs No change 10 month period for laid off 
teachers to remain in reassigned 
teacher pool with pay 
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Realizing concrete gains for the public (namely parents and their children) through the 
institution of the union is key to a successful social movement union.   The union was able to 
force a number of district policy changes through their contract negotiations, linking community 
support for better education conditions to their contract.   
The primary win came from pushing Emanuel to withdraw $88 million from the TIF fund 
and direct it for CPS funding, including new additional funding previously not in the budget to 
pay for both teacher compensation and new programs.  One of those programs was creating 
enforceable class-size caps for elementary schools (the first class-size caps in 20 years)101.  Any 
kindergarten to 2nd grade classes with more than 32 students will receive teachers assistants 
(CPS has designated $7 million for this program).  The agreement also reserves $10 million to 
$27 million ($500,000 per school) to provide after-school programs, counseling, social work, 
psychiatric services and medical clinics at 20-55 ‘community schools’ that will be designated by 
a joint committee of union members and CPS officials.  This money from the district will also 
come from outside sources, effectively increasing school budgets by looking for new streams of 
revenue dedicated to public education, such as TIF funds.102  Additionally, the agreement 
included a ban of school closings for the first two years of the contract, and following those two 
years, only if the schools don’t meet a set percentage of student graduation can they be closed.103   
Conclusion 
Due to risky policy making and use of exotic financial devices, Chicago Public Schools 
have been underfunded and in debt from the late 90’s onwards.  CPS followed a national trend of 
policies to abandon significant public school improvement, instead looking to the private sector 
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for solutions.  The union’s transformation was spurred in response to aggressive school closings, 
expansion of charters, and limiting laws directed at teachers unions. 
The caucus’s activism focused around stopping school closings led them to form genuine 
coalitions with parents and community groups that continued once the caucus took leadership of 
the union.  The union’s creation of strong public support by connecting their interests as 
employees to the interests of the most immediately interested parties, namely the public through 
parents and students, was central to their social movement unionism.  CTU transformed into a 
social movement union to effectively gain defensive wins in both the 2012 and 2016 contract 
















CHAPTER 3: Los Angeles Case Study 
 
Whereas CTU in Chicago quickly transformed into a rank and file driven union after 
CORE took leadership in 2010, the United Teachers Los Angeles (UTLA) went through a series 
of different reform leaderships from 2005 until the reform caucus, Progressive Educators for 
Action, (PEAC) assumed full leadership of the union in 2014.  The context for UTLA’s 
transformation is similar to that of Chicago’s; there had been an expansion of corporate 
education reform and a series of budget crises leading to attacks on the teachers union.  PEAC’s 
takeover of UTLA led to a significant change in union focus towards a social movement union 
model by pushing meaningful membership involvement and coalition building, culminating in a 
successful contract campaign and optimistic forward vision. 
This case study is divided into three sections.  The first section will explain the 
contributing factors to Los Angeles’s education budget crises, the following implementation of 
corporate education reform, and the resulting impact on the city’s public school system.  The 
second section will track the union politics of ULTA through the three different leaderships from 
2005 to 2017, focusing on the reform caucus’s (PEAC) efforts to mobilize membership towards 
a rank and file driven union.  The third section will look at the strategies of each of the different 
leaderships, focusing on the union’s response to 2009 budget cuts and their 2015 contract 
campaign.  
Section 1: Context of Los Angeles United School District (LAUSD) from 2005 - 2017  
UTLA’s changes in leadership and strategy developed in response to the combined 
impact of the growing charter school project and growing funding crises.  This section will first 
explain California’s district and school funding structures, specific tax laws, and how that has led 
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to an underfunding of California public schools.  The section will then explain why enrollment 
decline negatively affects school districts and how public schools bear the brunt of the impact of 
the rising numbers of charter schools.  The section will then lay out charter schools’ financial 
impact on LAUSD and district schools.  This section should help provide context to explain the 
shifts in UTLA leadership and strategy, particularly after facing approximately 9,000 layoffs and 
losing almost a fifth of its membership over 8 years - mostly from 2009-2011.104 
Reeling from the 2008 recession and its impact on state budgets, California faced a 
massive budget crisis of $11.2 billion105.  Governor Schwarzenegger sought to cut a sizable 
portion of the deficit through cutting education funding across the state.  In 2009, LAUSD, 
anticipating a projected 470 million budget deficit, proposed massive cuts including cutting the 
majority of summer school programs106 and 8,000 layoffs of administrators, teachers, and 
support employees.107  Just two years later, in 2011, LAUSD faced a further $408 million deficit 
and proposed cutting another 5,000 LAUSD employees108.  Under several different leaderships, 
UTLA worked to oppose these layoffs using a variety of strategies and was able to limit the 
massive cuts a little; the proposed 8,554 layoffs in 2009 were reduced to 6,000 and the 5,000 
layoffs in 2011 were reduced to approximately 3000 layoffs.109 
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Although the recession played a significant role in the 2009 budget crisis, California had 
passed earlier laws that led to a reduction in state tax revenues and also created local government 
taxing autonomy that resulted in an unpreparedness to deal with the economic crisis of 2009. 
 Proposition 13, passed in 1978, led to California schools being primarily dependent on 
the state for their funding.  Designed to protect homeowners from rising property taxes as more 
people were moving to California in the late 70s, Prop 13 lowered property taxes and limited 
subsequent changes to property taxes.  Prop 13 also rolled back assessed property values to their 
1975 value; capped increases to property value by 2% per year; capped the property tax at 1%; 
ruled that property should be  re-assessed only upon change of ownership or new construction; 
and mandated that all changes to local and state taxes need a two-thirds majority vote.110  The tax 
reform also assigned the authority of distributing property tax revenues to local agencies, such as 
school systems, to control of the state.111  As intended, Prop 13 immediately decreased local and 
state tax collection, limiting local school districts’ abilities to raise sufficient funds for their 
public education systems.  California’s per pupil spending decreased significantly since the 
implementation of Prop 13, which ultimately lead to Proposition 98. 
California’s average per pupil spending has consistently been below the average U.S. 
spending per pupil, but dropped dramatically - from 3.7% in 1977-78, to 3.4% in 1978-79 and 
then to 3.19% in 1985-86.  Prop 98 mandated a minimum education spending level dependent on 
the economic situation at that time.  In years of strong economic growth, spending would equal 
the level of the previous year plus capita growth and student enrollment adjustments.112  In years 
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of weak economic growth, the spending level would guarantee the previous year’s spending in 
addition to “adjustment for enrollment growth increases for changes in per capita general fund 
revenues, and an increase in .5 percent in state general funds.”  Despite Prop 98’s attempted 
protections, education spending has dropped in California and the gap between California’s per 
capita spending on education and the U.S. average has grown -  with the 2008-2009 U.S. average 
at 4.25% and California’s average at 3.3%.  
These gaps in spending levels are not representative of a strong education system with a 
particularly efficient or effective form of spending.  In 2010 California was ranked 50th in the 
nation in student to teacher ratio and was ranked 44th in K-12 spending per student.113  To 
address the persistent budget deficit, in 2012 California voters passed Proposition 30 that 
increased income tax levels for residents with an annual income over $250,000 and also 
increased the state sales tax by .25 percent for four years.114  At the end of the four year period in 
2016, the sales tax increase expired but voters passed Proposition 55 to extended the 2012 
income tax rates for another 12 years. 
Corporate Education Reform in LA 
The charter school movement has grown in LA - from the first charter school in 1993 to 
about 250 independent and affiliated charter schools attended by over 130,000 students in 2016 - 
making LA the district with the largest number of students in charters in the U.S.115  The growth 
of charter schools in LA has had a significant financial impact on LAUSD’s budget, specifically 
due to a variety of policies (or lack of policies put in place by LAUSD).  In 2016, UTLA 
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commissioned MGT of America, a national consulting company, to conduct a study on the fiscal 
impact of charter schools on LAUSD.  The study found that different district and state policies 
effecting charter schools and school funding impacted LAUSD district schools negatively (with 
some policies having much larger financial implications that others).  The state policies are not 
within the direct control of LAUSD, but they, nevertheless, contribute to and help explain the 
failing public school funding, particularly in relation to the growth of charter schools.  However 
the LAUSD school board is in control of district policy and could enact changes or enforce 
current law to help reduce charter schools’ financial burden on the district.  The following 
section will explain California’s district and school funding structure and how that funding 
structure leads to a relative enrollment decline in public schools in comparison to charter schools 
and the resulting negative impact on those public schools.  The next section will go through 
various findings of MGT’s study that show the direct financial burden imposed by charter 
schools on LAUSD as a result of district policy. 
California funds schools based on Average Daily Attendance (ADA) which is calculated 
by taking student attendance per day and dividing that number by the number of school days in 
the period (essentially actual attendance divided by expected attendance).  A school’s funding 
then gets adjusted with any changes in ADA -  if the ADA goes up, so does its funding (and vice 
versa).116  School districts in California are funded based on fixed and variable costs.  Fixed costs 
are the set costs the board has agreed to pay for the school to function for the number of students 
who will attend the school, such as the electricity bill for the school or custodian’s salary for 
cleaning the classroom.  The variable costs increase and decrease proportionally to the number of 
students, but once the money has been spent concretely based on the set number of students, it 
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becomes a fixed cost.  For example, when buying textbooks for an expected class of 25, the cost 
of the 25 textbooks becomes fixed regardless of whether there are 25 students in the class.   
Partially due to the funding structure, enrollment decline becomes an issue for public 
schools but not for charter schools.  Teacher salaries and benefits are distributed between fixed 
and variable costs, but if enrollment begins to drop to the extent that full class loads are shrinking 
or classes can be combined, teacher jobs become seen as variable costs.  Enrollment decline is 
financially detrimental to a district because as enrollment declines, so does funding, but in 
practice decreases in revenues and costs rarely align.117  When a student leaves a public school 
(for example to attend a charter school) 100% of that student’s funding is cut from the district 
funding, but all the costs of that student do not leave with the student as the fixed costs from the 
student’s previous enrollment remain (an estimated at least 55%,of student’s revenue goes into 
fixed costs).118   
The total enrollment in LA has been declining since its peak in 2002-2003 due to a 
number of complex factors including a reduced birth-rate and the increased cost of living in 
southern California.119  Although this larger trend is not attributable to the rise of charter schools, 
as the total LAUSD enrollment declines as charter school enrollment rises because of transfers 
from public to charter schools, the burden of enrollment decline is felt almost entirely in public 
schools.  The percentage of students in charters goes up every year; from 2009-2010 to 2015-
2016, LAUSD total enrollment had declined 6.49% while the percentage of students in 
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independent charter schools has more than doubled from 7.4% to 15.7% and the actual 
percentage becomes larger when considering affiliated charter schools.120121 
LAUSD has a significantly higher proportion of high-need and high-cost special 
education students as well as English language students than the charter schools in the district.122  
LAUSD is indirectly penalized financially for having a disproportionately number of high-need 
students because California’s funding formula provides equal funding per student enrollment, 
regardless of additional need.  In addition to suffering financially due to enrollment declines, the 
public schools also enroll a larger percentage of high-need students and this combination of 
lower funding per student with more high-need students makes it difficult for public schools to 
provide a high quality education. 
Although some are more significant than other, the findings from the MGT study show 
how LAUSD could address some of the uncovered charters’ costs to the district with policy 
changes.  There is a 1% annual oversight revenue collected from the charter schools that is 
designed to cover the district’s Charter School Division (CSD), but the funds do not adequately 
cover the $92,000/year cost of the division’s office.123  There are additional oversight costs from 
the Special Education Department (SPED) and Office of Inspector General (OIG) that are 
estimated at $1,416,259 for additional charter school specific SPED staff and a larger charter-
specific caseload for OIG that is not covered by Charter revenue.124  The law allows the district 
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to collect a 3% oversight fee from charter schools that operate in district facilities that do not pay 
rent (56 charters are in this situation), yet none of the 56 schools pay the fee - the estimated lost 
revenue is $2,062,517.125   
The study also found indirect costs (through time/opportunity losses) to LAUSD where 
district staff spend time managing and working with charter schools instead of district schools.  
These indirect costs are estimated at $13,845,203 for costs not already included in the 1% 
oversight fee.  These indirect costs cannot always be directly accountable - some are for services 
that can be tracked and then charged to the charter organization that used them, whereas some 
are less visible - such as those costs to the departments of finance, human resources, and student 
services that are required  to adapt their practices to account for the differing charters’ systems.  
Charters benefit from these services and increase the caseload for certain departments without 
paying for that additional necessary work that must be done by the LAUSD.  All of these 
findings are based on district policies that could be changed or simply enforced more strictly by 
the district.   
The LA public education system has gone through significant changes from 2002-2003 to 
2016-2017 with a declining enrollment, increase in the charter school movement, and massive 
budget cuts.  Prior to the 2009-2012 budget deficit, LAUSD was already a struggling school 
system with a lack of funding, and the budget cuts resulted in a huge reduction of teachers and 
support staff, laying off 9,000 employees and UTLA members between just 2009-2012.  As staff 
was cut, class sizes rose past the set caps (in times of economic crisis LAUSD schools are 
allowed to break class size caps) - in 2015 there were 1,427 middle school courses and 1,242 
high school courses that had 45 or more students in the class.  Parents and community members 
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are, in some ways, primed for social movement organizing because of the negative effects of the 
larger economic crisis and the district’s policies. 
 
Section 2: Internal Union Elections and Politics 
This section will go through the three changes in leadership in UTLA from 2005 - 2017: 
the election of the United Action slate in 2005, Warren Fletcher’s election in 2011, and the 
United Power slate in 2014.  Each election period will describe the slate/candidates campaign, 
and then how their terms affected the following election period.  The following section, focused 
on strategy, will go into greater details of each group’s tactics and actions. The section will also 
track the reform caucus PEAC’s, (Progressive Educators for Action) activity in UTLA for the 
past 12 years, which resulted in them eventually winning a majority on the board and presidency 
in 2014.    
United Action Slate (2005 - 2011) 
In 2005, the slate United Action ran and won UTLA’s elections on a campaign that 
promised to mobilize rank and file teachers, school workers, as well as other school related 
actors such as students and parents.  The slate was a broad coalition composed of PEAC 
members and other self-styled union reformers.  The slate also endorsed a number of other 
opposition candidates in an effort to remove passive incumbents, most importantly A.J. Duffy 
was endorsed for President.  Since the early 2000s, PEAC has been active in fighting corporate 
education reform - often through members organizing in their schools against the increase in 
standardized tests and punishment of ‘failing schools’.126  Although the coalition was created 
around reforming UTLA and held some common ideas, the mixed slate included a wide range of 
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different visions for the union.  Once elected this led to difficulty in creating a cohesive series of 
changes to the union.   
The slate extended their focus past traditional salary and benefits issues, and pushed 
additional changes such as “class-size reduction, teacher participation in curriculum planning and 
implementation, and a sharp reduction in standardized testing,” and argued to make those 
changes with an active rank and file.127  The heavily involved caucus had been critical of the 
union’s leadership for the preceding two years, specifically their reliance on elected school board 
members and lack of offensive action.  The previous leadership was criticized specifically for 
trying to reduce standardized testing through lobbying efforts at the state and federal level, which 
was largely unsuccessful, (particularly as corporate education reform moves to become a 
bipartisan agenda.  The coalition ran a grassroots campaign of teachers, forming campaigning 
groups in 7 of the 8 UTLA geographic areas/chapters and seeking endorsements from shop 
stewards and chapter chairs.128  The slate fundraised money to mail out a “United Action Voter's 
Guide” to the union’s 42,000 members and got flyers into most of the 600+ schools.129  Their 
efforts led to 1,000 more votes over the previous election in election turnout.130  
The election was the first time in UTLA history in which an opposition slate won a 
sizable number of seats.  The coalition endorsed and elected Joshua Pechthlat for UTLA/AFT 
vice president, Julie Washington for elementary vice president, David Goldberg for treasurer, 
and A.J. Duffy for President.131  The coalition had formed against a longtime incumbent 
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leadership that practiced a bureaucratic and inactive rank and file unionism, but they did not have 
a unified strategy plan for change. 
PEAC was still a fairly small caucus in 2005 and would have been unable to successfully 
run an individual campaign, let alone support a slate if elected.  Instead the caucus started the 
coalition slate United Action to begin a reform effort and gain power in the leadership.  Although 
they played a large role in forming the slate, the coalition was fairly broad in reach and was only 
a first step in trying to activate membership to vote and move towards a rank and file union.  
PEAC used the election’s success to build a larger base for the reform caucus and in 2014, a 
more heavily PEAC led slate won out, with one of PEAC’s founding members, Alex Caputo-
Pearl, as UTLA president. 
As explained in the context section, LAUSD faced a large budget deficit from 2009-
2012, and despite their resistance, faced massive layoffs and lost approximately 6,000 members 
of the 42,000 person union.  Losing around 14% of a union’s membership over just three years 
can bring bread and butter issues to the forefront of memberships minds, as questions of reform 
fall by the wayside in favor of questions of survival.  In terms of the reform project, the slate 
produced mixed results for union reform.  While they were able to make some gains in activating 
membership to take action and expanding the politics of the union, they lacked unity and a 
cohesive plan for leadership and were unable to really enact effective change.  The United 
Action slate ran a reform focused campaign, but were unprepared to deal with the budget crisis 
(not that the leadership prior to their election necessarily would have been, since the external 
economic crisis placed a huge amount of financial stress on California and LAUSD) and as the 
reform group did not live up to expectations, there was a backlash against reform groups.  That 
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backlash opened up the elections for Warren Fletcher, a bread and butter candidate, and he was 
elected president from 2011-2014. 
Warren Fletcher (2011 - 2014) 
In April 2011, Warren Fletcher won 53% to 47% over Vice President Julie Washington 
(who had been endorsed by PEAC).132   PEAC candidates won four officer positions out of the 
seven in the union’s leadership and PEAC also won the majority of the union’s board of 
directors.133  Active UTLA teacher Gillian Russom said that the membership voted for Fletcher 
primarily out of disappointment in the previous reform project in addition to their inability to 
defend membership jobs.134  Fletcher represented a return to bread and butter issues and 
bureaucratic strategy with little rank and file involvement, such as focusing on bringing in better 
negotiators for the union.  
 Throughout his presidency, Fletcher was unsuccessful in fighting for bread and butter 
issues namely failing to secure a contract.  As in the case of the previous United Action 
leadership, Fletcher’s presidency lead to a backlash against the old form of unionism, opening up 
room for PEAC’s social movement unionist slate.  
Despite holding the majority of officer seats and a majority on the board of directors, 
PEAC found “it was very hard to move any kind of progressive agenda around a really non-
progressive president.  Unfortunately, structurally the president in our union had a lot of sway,” 
according to area chair and teacher Gillian Russom.135  PEAC board members would bring 
proposals to meetings but the meetings were run in such a bureaucratic manner by the head 
leadership that the meeting often wouldn’t get to important points on the agenda and the 
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proposals wouldn’t even be discussed.  PEAC instead dedicated energy to mobilizing teachers 
for the caucus’s vision of the union in preparation for the 2014 elections.  This consisted of 
focusing on local efforts of progressive area chairs who could do positive work in those areas, 
such as holding actions and supporting school-site organizing, and creating The Schools L.A. 
Students Deserve coalition and then referendum.136 
The Schools L.A. Students Deserve was a coalition formed in 2012, made up of PEAC, 
the Latino Caucus, Coalition for Educational Justice and other groups in order to push a 
resolution with the same name through UTLA’s referendum process.  Because UTLA’s contract 
with LAUSD ended in 2012, the resolution called for UTLA to run a contract campaign “starting 
by working with community groups and parents to identify shared issues… put more resources 
into both member and community organizing, and plan a series of escalating actions.”137   The 
resolution passed through the rank and file voting process in February 2013 with 70% of teachers 
who voted supporting the resolution.138  With such broad support for the resolution, it also served 
as a strategic plan for PEAC to mobilize/campaign around in the 2014 elections, as 70% of the 
teachers who voted supported the resolution139   
United Power (2014-2017) 
In the spring of 2014, the reform Union Power slate, heavily run and endorsed by PEAC, 
won the presidency (Alex Caputo-Pearl) and the majority of seats on UTLA’s executive board.  
The slate was made up of returning officers, teacher activists and PEAC members.  The Union 
Power slate ran on their resolution and vision for The School’s LA Students Deserve, pushing a 
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model of community, teacher, and union partnership to fight for both union agenda and shared 
interests.   
 
Section 3:  Strategies and Campaigns of the Different Leaderships 
United Action (2005 – 2011) 
In preparation for the conflict over budget cuts, teachers in one of UTLA’s eight areas 
began boycotting district-assigned standardized tests called periodic assessments in January 
2009.  “Rather, the boycott was hastily called to escalate the pushback against stalled contract 
negotiations and budget cuts by a union leadership under pressure from fed-up teachers to step 
up the fight” said Sarah Knopp teacher co-chair of her LAUSD school.140  At first there was little 
community outreach explaining the boycott and it received mixed support; about half of the 
teachers complied with the boycott.  But the union leadership then posted materials on their 
website and sent out a case, written by elementary school Vice President Julie Washington, 
arguing against periodic tests and explaining the boycott in the UTLA newsletter sent to all 
teachers.  The boycott lasted throughout the school year as the contract negotiations and question 
of layoffs continued. 
Unlike other standardized testing, which often plays a role in which schools receive what 
funding, the tests are mandated by LAUSD and hold no connection to state or federal funding (or 
mandate).  The boycott explicitly protested three impacts of the testing.  First, teachers argued 
that the testing itself does not help students learn and instead forces teachers to constantly ‘teach 
to the test’.  The assessments are given quarterly in math, english, science, and social studies, 
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which comes on top of the mandatory federal and state testing, leading teachers to design their 
curriculum around preparing for the different tests.141  Second, the test data is also aggregated by 
teacher, setting up a system for teacher evaluations or salary being based on students’ test results 
(which then leads to further teaching to the test).  Although test results were not considered in 
LA teacher evaluations in 2009, similar systems had been implemented across the country, such 
as in Washington D.C, and were eventually implemented in LA in 2013.  Third, UTLA 
calculated that when one adds up the contracts with Princeton Review and McGraw Hill (these 
two companies write and score the tests), their tests, and paid staff training time, the total cost is 
over $100 million per year.  The union argued that the testing was a strong example of corporate 
education reform, specifically directing a shrinking amount of education’s budget towards more 
testing and gathering data on student success at the cost of class sizes, course offerings, and 
summer school programs.142 
UTLA demanded that the board should use their federal stimulus funds to avoid the 
teacher’s layoffs and maintain class size rather than save the funds for the following year’s 
budget.  At the March school board meeting where the cuts were up for vote, teachers illegally 
occupied the boardroom to protest and try to delay the vote.  However, the board left and voted 
in the backroom in favor of the layoffs.  At the end of April, UTLA threatened a one-day strike 
the protest the layoffs and passed the membership authorization vote with 75%.  However, the 
UTLA contract does not allow a strike over layoffs and LAUSD was granted an injunction 
against the strike.  Striking individuals would have faced fines up to $1000 and risked their 
teaching credentials and the union could have faced millions of dollars in fines, a financial 
burden the union could not bear.  In response to the injunction, the union leadership moved to 
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cancel the strike, instead organizing rallies before and after the proposed strike school day with 
over 1,000 teachers showing up.143  The same day a smaller group of just under a hundred 
protesters sat in front of the district office and 40 union members were arrested for blocking 
traffic, including President A.J. Duffy and Vice President Josh Pechthalt.144 
The union continued to organize rallies and protests in attempts to pressure the school 
board into using more of their federal stimulus money on keeping jobs.  On May 15th (the day 
pink slips were distributed at 7 middle and high schools), large groups of students refused to 
enter their schools and marched around their campus in protest of the layoffs and resulting 
increased class size.  At Santee education complex, students refused to enter the school until 
administrators agreed that they would be able to meet with superintendent Ramon Cortines.  
After he failed to meet with the students, 400 students walked three miles to protest at his office 
a few days later.   
The union leadership faced criticism from some membership after running a strike 
authorization vote that received 75% in support, then cancelling the strike, despite the potential 
sanctions.  Teachers at Santee education complex and Lincoln High voted “no confidence” in the 
UTLA leadership.145  The initial testing boycotts were also initially a signal from a group of 
members for UTLA leadership to take more direct action against layoffs and contract 
negotiations.   
Chapter chairs at four schools put out a call for a hunger strike and camp-out at schools 
on May 26th called Hungry for a Better Education campaign.  This group was mostly made up of 
younger and newer teachers who were more affected by the cuts and felt somewhat left behind 
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by UTLA and began organizing on their own.  Supporters camped out every night for weeks at 
the schools most affected by the cuts before eventually moving to the district headquarters.  
Although the occupation action was relatively small, it was publicized and was visited by state 
legislators at times.146  Nine teachers participated in the full hunger strike, with two teachers 
lasting more than 15 days, and hundreds of one day solidarity hunger strikes and rolling 
solidarity fasts.147148  The hunger strike specifically called for using LAUSD’s federal stimulus 
money to save the classroom jobs that would be cut to avoid large increases in class size.   
Warren Fletcher (2011 – 2014) 
In June 2011, UTLA and LAUSD made a one year agreement to help address the budget 
deficit and stop 3,400 of the proposed 5,000 layoffs on the condition that staff accepted four 
more furlough days in the following school year.149  The agreement was voted on favorably by 
20,000 of the 25,000 members.150  
On January 20th, 2013, UTLA approved an agreement to use student test scores for 
evaluating teachers due to a new state law requiring some form of student test data to be 
involved in teacher evaluations.  The agreement was passed by 66% of the 16,892 members who 
voted.151  The evaluations changed to be based on raw state test score, district assessments, high 
school exit exams, and rates of attendance, graduation, suspensions, and course completion.152  
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Although linking tests to evaluations, the agreement required that the change would be used in 
the most limited way possible; the test measures could be used in the informal part of the 
meeting but could not be used for final decisions and evaluations.153   
United Power (2014 - Present (2017)) 
 UTLA under the Union Power leadership have used social movement unionism not only 
as a way to push for education reform, but also as a better strategy to protect bread and butter 
issues.  This may be particularly true when a union is in a defensive position attempting to 
defend their jobs, benefits, and salary as opposed to a union attempting to make larger demands 
of their employer.  The Union Power leadership slate was closely linked to PEAC, which offered 
an alternative vision for how to make change and fight corporate education reform.  PEAC 
promoted a bottom-up strategy and believed that through building an active membership and 
coalition with affected actors, such as students and their families, they would be able to better 
negotiate and push forward their vision for their schools and education.  PEAC’s focus connects 
bread and butter issues to the underfunding of schools and general attacks on public education. 
From the Union Power win forward, UTLA immediately began organizing a contract 
campaign and devoting resources to The Schools LA Students Deserve Campaign through 
focusing on engaging the membership in more meaningful ways.  The campaign primarily 
focused on class-size and salary increases in response to the previous year’s furlough days and 
lack of cost of living pay increases for multiple years.154  The previous years’ massive layoffs of 
teachers and support staff resulted in a large growth in class size across the district, leaving 
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almost 2,700 middle and high school classes operating with over 45 students.155  Luis Blazer, a 
math teacher at Rancho Dominguez Preparatory School, says via email, “My biggest concern is 
that it is not just one class of 45 students. It is five classes of 45 students. Two-hundred twenty-
five students to grade, support, give constructive feedback, differentiate instruction for, inspire 
and guide.”156  As class sizes grow to 40-45 students per classroom and teachers’ workloads 
change significantly with the class size and education reform issues become work condition 
issues for the membership as it becomes far more difficult for them to do their job satisfactorily.   
As UTLA moved forward with The Schools LA Students Deserve they significantly 
changed their internal union organization to build power in tandem with the escalating contract 
campaign.  UTLA created a political department, parent department, and research department for 
the union with some funding from NEA as the union was nearly broke after after years of 
shrinking dues.  UTLA leadership visited hundreds of schools to assess members’ willingness to 
strike and try to build involvement from the rank and file.157  On February 12, UTLA organized 
picketing at 850 schools and also began holding meetings for students, teachers and new teachers 
over contract demands and social justice education.  UTLA created local positions for member 
teachers called parent liaisons, whose job it is to engage parents with the Schools LA Students 
Deserve campaign, how they could be involved, and ask what their priorities were as parents.158  
They organized parent liaisons in 150 schools where they partnered with community 
organizations to hold monthly forums on inequality.  The union continued their coalition 
building, partnering with UCLA’s institute for Democracy, Education and Access, where they 
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held monthly meetings with 15 community organizations to discuss and plan around education 
justice. 
On February 26th, UTLA organized a large rally of 15,000 teachers, staff, union 
members and supporters at Grand Park in downtown LA.  The rally was the opening salvo of a 
plan of escalating actions in their contract campaign and included students, teachers, community 
members, and presidents of NEA, CFT (California Federation of Teachers), CTA (California 
Teachers Association) all as speakers.159  UTLA implemented a system of rosters, lists and 
records of one-on-one conversations to track which  teachers would be coming to which actions, 
and then tracked if they actually attended.160  One escalating action over a series of months was a 
call for district-wide boycott of faculty meetings.  With the accountability system in place, 
school stewards confirmed and reconfirmed participation, and if teachers were not striking the 
meetings for a particular reason, perhaps because of an aggressive principal for example, then 
UTLA would extend more resources to that school.161    
In March 2015 the contract negotiations stalled, which resulted in moving the 
negotiations to a state mediator and if negotiations failed there, the union could have legally 
moved to strike.  The union was preparing their members and organization for the potential of a 
strike with a series of escalating actions, flexing their strength with the potential of a strike.  
After a month of negotiating with a state mediator, the union approved a contract with 97% of 
25,407 voting members in favor of the agreement.  The union saw the final contract as a win 
with gains in for both salary and benefits issues, but also with policies to better public education 
in the district. 
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For wages and benefits, the contract held a total 10% wage increase over 2 years, starting 
with a 4% increase from July 2014, another 2% retroactive increase from January 2015, then 
another 2% each in July 2015 and in January 2016.162  This result came after the district initially 
proposed a 2% raise, and then a 5% raise as a response the union’s second proposal of 8.5%.163  
The salary increase came after members had had no salary increases since 2008 in addition to 
dealing with pay cuts from furlough days which the union accepted as concessions in order to 
keep union jobs.  The contract also protected 99% of member’s health care benefits from cuts for 
the two years of the contract.164  On more minor job security and contract enforcement issues, the 
contract requires LAUSD to inform UTLA members of accusations against them within three 
days of beginning investigations, to only allow reassignment of teachers if the person poses a 
safety risk, and speeds up the investigation process.  The length of time to submit a grievance 
also increased from fifteen to thirty days after the incident to allow more time for members to 
pressure administrators to reach on-site solutions.165 
In addition to winning on these bread and butter issues, the contract included concrete 
gains to better the struggling public schools, including class size caps and $13 million dollars 
earmarked for the express goal of reducing the district’s awful student to counselor ratio to under 
500-to-1, which is still far from ideal.166  The class size caps start with K-3 grades at 27 students 
with the caps increasing by grade to 46 for high school juniors and seniors and school-wide class 
averages must be three students below the cap for that grade.167  The class size caps are still 
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somewhat small wins; although they create limits on class size, set the precedent for caps and 
should reduce class size across LAUSD, the actual caps are still very high and schools continue 
to have massive class sizes that are highly difficult to learn and teach within. 
The union has also pushed political activity outside of direct union work in May 2015, 
running campaigns for candidates for the LAUSD school board.  Two UTLA backed candidates 
for the LAUSD school board forced a runoff election against candidates backed financially by 
charter school organizations and wealthy advocates of charter schools.168  One charter candidate 
won one spot, replacing UTLA endorsed board member Bennett Kayser with Ref Rodriguez.  
UTLA backed Scott Schmerelson won over Incumbent Tamar Galatzan.  The election was the 
most expensive one in LAUSD history, with outside organizations and donors donating 5.1 
million dollars, almost exclusively to charter school backed candidates.169 
Since their 2015 contract campaign, UTLA has continued their focus on building a strong 
social movement union, both by increasing member dues by one third to explicitly fight a 
growing reform movement and continuing their organizing efforts to reach teachers in charters.  
UTLA also seeks to organize teachers in charter schools and as of 2016 has 1000 members who 
work in charters with a variety of different contract operators and therefore variety of 
contracts.170 
The Build the Future, Fund the Fight campaign was an effort by UTLA leadership to get 
the membership to reinvest in their union by increasing their dues by one-third to further expand 
their union’s ability to build support for the union’s vision of public education.  The leadership 
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made the case that the monthly increase in dues (about $19 a month) would be necessary to fight 
charter campaigns backed by billions of dollars, specifically the Broad-Walmart plan to expand 
charters in LAUSD.171  The increase was particularly necessary after CTU was financially 
struggling because of their shrinking membership and because the massive layoffs reduced the 
union’s monthly dues and the 2015 contract campaign required a great deal of resources (some 
of which NEA helped pay for).   In February 2016, 82% of members voted in favor of the dues 
increase, which demonstrates the internal commitment to SMU strategy from UTLA’s 
membership.172 
Conclusion 
LAUSD has been consistently underfunded since the 80s due to old changes in tax 
structures that became exacerbated by the expansion of charters and enrollment decline.  The 
financial crisis of 2008 then pushed the already struggling district into a major budget crisis that 
the district tried to address with massive layoffs.  The initial United Action reform slate tried to 
move towards a SMU model and mobilized teachers for actions in response to the proposed cuts 
but was unable to organize effectively and combat the layoffs.  Warren Fletcher was unable to 
win bread and butter benefits or even secure a contract, leading to PEAC’s United Power slate 
winning the presidency in 2014 and transforming the union towards a SMU model with a 
significant contract win. 
While Chicago provides a model transformation of service union to social movement 
union stemming from the momentum of a successful reform caucus, the LA case can serve as an 
example of a more difficult path towards a similar kind of SMU and potentially be more useful 
for other reform caucuses to study.  The overwhelmingly positive response from the membership 
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for increasing dues by one third demonstrates the rank and file’s support of the union and its 























CHAPTER 4: Analysis of the Two Cases 
The prior two chapters outlined the contexts in which the unions’ transformations took 
place, the natures of the transformations themselves, and how these were impacted by and 
impacted their contract campaigns and conflicts with the district.  This chapter will look at the 
similarities and differences between the cases in terms of context, internal transformation, and 
strategies of external pressure and will try to draw from that analysis particular lessons that can 
contribute to a creating an effective SMU model or campaign.   Underlying this analysis is the 
argument that a SMU model for teachers unions can better secure bread and butter issues and 
defend against corporate education reform than a service model. 
The Chicago and LA case studies are an opportunity to look at two large teacher unions 
in a similar economic and political context: underfunded public schools under primarily 
Democratic governments.  Both districts were increasingly underfunded for a long period of time 
leading up to the union transformations and mobilization.  In LA, proposition 13 limited local 
cities’ autonomy to increase taxes for public education and put the authority for distributing 
property tax revenues to local agencies into the hands of the state.  Despite efforts to lessen the 
decrease in public education budget with various propositions, education spending in California 
dropped and LAUSD found itself in a continuous budget crisis.  In the same period, Chicago’s 
Public Schools built up a serious debt through poor policy decisions regarding teachers pensions, 
then mismanaged that debt with risky financial decisions.  CPS also had been underfunded over 
many years as a result of Chicago’s implementation of Tax Increment Financing (TIF). 
Each city’s policies in response to their funding crises followed a similar path of layoffs, 
more heavily instituted corporate education reform, and management failures that looked bad in 
the eyes of the public.  Both Chicago and LA suffered school district layoffs with about 2,500 in 
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Chicago after 2010 and 6,000 in the ten years before CORE entered office, and around 9,000 in 
LA.  As two of the largest school districts in the country, LA and Chicago have been subject to 
an aggressive corporate education agenda with large numbers of school closings partnered with 
charter school expansion.  Corporate education reform also takes the form of creating policies 
that work to limit teachers’ unions and increase core curriculum and standardized testing, with 
the results data attached to teacher evaluations.  
In Chicago, the mismanagement of the pension fund was a large misstep for CPS. It 
increased the debt of the city, while also putting the pensions for public sector workers from the 
city into a more precarious situation.  Both cities also had their superintendents resign over fraud 
in conflicts of interest over no-bid contracts with educational product companies.  Barbara Byrd-
Bennett was Mayor Emanuel’s handpicked CEO (superintendent position in Chicago) and served 
from 2012 until her resignation in 2015.  Shortly after her 2015 resignation, Byrd-Bennett 
pleaded guilty to bribery in a $22 million kickback scheme with an education consulting 
company she previously worked for and is currently facing between three and a half to seven and 
a half years in prison.  In LA, Superintendent John Deasy (2011-2014) tried to implement a $1.3 
billion dollar technology plan to give Ipads to every student and teacher in the district.  This 
failed as a policy, but more importantly, led to a multiple year FBI investigation into the bidding 
process for the tablet contract.  Deasy was investigated for having conflicts of interest after 
emails and contact surfaced between Deasy, Pearson and Apple prior to the bidding process, 
leading to Deasy’s resignation. 
The similarities in the two city’s cases extend past just the context the unions operated 
under, but also to each union’s structure itself prior to the caucuses reform campaigns.  PEAC 
and CORE pushed their union reform projects in opposition to an inactive and ineffective service 
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union leadership.  Unfortunately, an ineffectual union leadership does not necessarily result in an 
energized response to change the union.  More typically, passivity grows within the union due to 
a growing lack of belief that change can happen.  While a service union model can satisfy 
membership’s needs for gains within certain political economic contexts, it accomplishes this 
while maintaining distance between rank and file and leadership and doesn’t require much work 
for the members.  UTLA Area Chair Gillian Russom said “what we found was that distrust, 
demobilization, and passivity that was caused by the service model made it difficult even for 
opposition organizing, because the level of passivity in that members hadn’t been engaged in 
even discussions about what we were facing, in grassroots school-site organizing or even in just 
rallies.”  It is critical for a membership to overcome such passivity and disillusionment for a shift 
to a social movement model to happen, as a SMU requires an immense amount of 
work.  Worsening attacks on the membership, in which people’s livelihoods become threatened 
are also a factor and a spur to action.  This was the case in Chicago and LA. 
Significant differences in the two unions’ contexts are much fewer than similarities.  The 
primary distinction is that since 1995 Chicago’s mayor has had a extensive amount of executive 
control over the city’s education system, as both the superintendent position and school board are 
appointed by the mayor.  This means there are very few ways of changing education policy in the 
city outside of the purview of the mayor.  Another difference is that while both cities tried to 
address budget deficits with large layoffs and school closings, UTLA suffered more layoffs over 





Internal Organizing and Building Power 
Separating internal power building from external pressure is a useful way to look at how 
certain strategies are focused on building the necessary internal structure to respond to highly 
demanding external pressure.  However, this can ignore how internal building strategies double 
as a tactic against the district and how external actions play a role in building solidarity and 
internal organizing ability.  Much of the early internal reform for activating membership 
happened alongside coalition building with parents or community organizations.  Building public 
support and coalitions is a necessity of successful social movement unionism and will be 
included in the internal power building section. 
CORE and PEAC came to power in the union leadership in different ways.  CORE won 
quickly in 2010 after winning a few lower elected seats, whereas PEAC was unable to present 
and win a cohesive slate until 2014, despite having some members in UTLA leadership since 
2005. 
The section will look at differences and similarities between each caucus’s organizing 
leading up to their election, then what kind of reforms each caucus put forward to activate 
membership and build power once elected.  The section discussing internal union mobilization 
strategy in PEAC is more developed because the union went through waves of disinterest in a 
SMU.  In this area, we can learn more from that case than CORE in Chicago, which was able to 
build its power effectively and take leadership fully with a strategic vision. 
CORE’s formation as a local activist group, with continuous activism while building its 
membership, played a huge role in its success.  CORE had originally formed as a group of 
teachers partnering with local community organizations for the purpose of stopping school 
closings in their area.  The group shifted into a small caucus and while increasing a focus on 
79 
growing their numbers, the group continued to center their caucus around fighting school 
closings and became even more active, succeeding in stopping closings.  Prior to any union 
election, the caucus had proven their ability to make change through action and also had created 
meaningful coalition relationships with community organizations. 
PEAC’s takeover of the union, in the form of winning the presidency and nearly all 
leadership positions, took almost ten years, as opposed to CORE winning these positions 
relatively quickly in their first major election in 2010.  In 2005, PEAC played a large role in 
forming the United Action slate that unseated previous union incumbents and began to mobilize 
rank and file members in reaction to 2009 budget cuts.  The 2009 fight over layoffs had a 
mobilizing effect on the rank and file and required some organizing to hold their large effective 
rallies -- the more deliberate internal organizing of 2014 was not yet present in their 
strategy.  The union at this point did not make serious internal transformations to mobilize 
membership, as the elected leadership came as a mixed coalition, but some of the leadership’s 
goal was still activating the rank and file.  Although not a union tactic and not a positive reason 
for mobilization, the threat of and eventual follow through of massive layoffs also had an 
energizing effect.  In 2009, UTLA held numerous rallies and protests in preparation for their 
potential strike 
The union’s tactic of boycotting standardized testing serves as an example of a good 
tactic with clumsy rollout. The organizing of 2009 largely consisted of actions that gathered 
teachers together to act, but without a sustained building of internal solidarity.  The boycott 
started as much from teachers in one of UTLA’s eight areas as a call for the union to prepare for 
upcoming contract battle as to pressure the district.  Because there was little community outreach 
explaining the boycotts, the strategy received mixed support and there was little follow through 
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from other areas until the leadership explained the boycott in a union newsletter.   
The reform efforts of 2009 had positive and negative effects for getting members 
engaged with the union.  Although the 2009 fight got teachers engaged in public actions fighting 
the district, and started to shift towards a social movement union, the relative failure of those 
efforts created a minor backlash towards an SMU approach, resulting in three years of a bread-
and-butter-focused leader and passivity.  Overall, the effect was mostly positive towards building 
a social movement union, given that the membership voted overwhelmingly in favor of change 
in union strategy once presented with ‘The Schools LA Students’ Deserve’ referendum.  It also 
meant that once PEAC entered the leadership, they did so with an understanding of the 
importance of a united vision and strategic plan. 
Both PEAC and CORE released studies called The Schools LA/Chicago Students 
Deserve on each city’s public school system and education reform policies for public schools.  In 
PEAC’s case, an additional strategic plan for how to bring about reform was included.  Prior to 
their 2012 strike, CTU released a study called The Schools Chicago’s Students Deserve that laid 
out a variety of education reforms that could improve public schools in Chicago.  The study 
became the union’s alternative vision for bettering public school education in opposition to 
corporate education reform.  Modeled after Chicago’s report, in 2013 PEAC formed a coalition 
of various LA political groups and then forwarded a member referendum called The Schools LA 
Students Deserve.  In addition to a series of education reforms, the report included an alternate 
vision of how the union could operate, essentially a proposal to shift towards a social movement 
union in the form of a referendum. 
Although titled the same, the reports were used differently, CTU’s served as a report to 
primarily provide an argument for education reform improvements not driven by corporate 
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education reform.  Providing this alternate vision for better public schools is key for successful 
coalition building and parent outreach since corporate education reform is often portrayed as the 
only possible way to better schools (in part because it has been the primary agenda for school 
improvements for these two districts).  The report was publicized as the unions’ visions for better 
schools and made available for parents. 
PEAC’s report came directly out of a coalition with the Latino Caucus, Coalition for 
Educational Justice and other groups and served to gain support for PEAC’s vision of UTLA and 
LAUSD in preparation for their election.  It also was their strategic plan for when 
elected.  Driven by a coalition, the report also had the effect of being circulated as another way 
of improving LA public schools, including publicizing to parents.   
In a manner similar to PEAC’s use of The Schools LA Students Deserve to prime the 
membership for the upcoming election, CORE published a report about CTU’s pension 
mismanagement when running two candidates for the board of pension funds,  then followed the 
report by visiting all the schools in the district and talking to teachers. 
Once PEAC fully came into the union leadership in 2014, they were prepared to 
internally transform UTLA into a more social movement driven union with an emphasis on 
sustained building of an active rank and file by systematizing building and tracking member 
participation.  After CORE’s 2010 election, the newly elected caucus similarly changed their 
internal union organization in an effort to mobilize rank and file members.   
PEAC created a political department, parent department, organizing department and 
research department as well as local parent liaison positions for teachers in every school to 
develop the role of parents and bring them into the campaign.  The forming of these departments 
was similar to CORE in its creation of an organizing department and research department in 
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2010 for their 2012 contract campaign.  The organizing department had 5 full time organizers to 
mobilize the rank and file.  CORE’s organizing department worked to make sure every school 
had an active delegate (essentially shop steward) for the union’s house of delegates, and to 
expand the role of delegates in their schools to host committee meetings focused around action 
and winning members over to the strategy.  PEAC created a system of rosters, lists and records 
of one-on-one conversations that worked to increase the number of teachers at events by 
confirming and reconfirming their participation as well as tracking which teachers actually 
attended from which schools.  This provided central leadership with data on which schools or 
areas required more resources.  According to Area Chair Gillian Russom, that shift from a 
service model’s requirement of stewards to an organizing model “was a huge deal to change. Our 
school stewards are called chapter chairs, [and to ask] ‘so like you want our chapter chairs to 
actually keep a list of people and check them off, and actually go talk to people one on one, and 
engage them?’ was like a whole culture change.”   
While the union tries to build public support through all their action, this section will 
describe some of the more deliberate efforts to reach out to parents to grow an internal network 
of parent support.  Both CTU in 2010 and UTLA in 2014 created parent departments for the 
purpose of engaging with one of the most important demographics to have as allies.  Somewhat 
obviously, if the people that run the schools and the people who have the most immediate vested 
interest in the schools fight for a certain kind of policy change, it becomes difficult for the 
district to oppose it.  CTU’s Contract Action Committees in 2010 reached out to other school 
workers and had members reach out to parents through becoming active in local school council 
meetings and circulating petitions for better school resources.  UTLA created the position of 
parent liaisons, whose job it was to reach out to and engage parents, in every school.  In 150 of 
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those schools, the liaisons partnered with community organizations to hold monthly forums on 
inequality.  CTU had also developed strong relationships with certain groups of parents through 
their earlier successful activism against school closings. 
 Creating union positions for reaching out to parents is one step in a process of building 
parent support by incorporating their interests in the union’s vision and then fighting for public 
school reform.  Connecting concrete gains for improving public schools to the union’s contract is 
important because teachers presumably care about bettering public school education for their 
students, and parents are more likely to become invested in the success of the contract 
campaign.  CTU’s 2012 campaign was unable to win education policy changes, UTLA’s 2015 
campaign won minor changes, and CTU’s 2016 campaign secured the most education 
improvement gains, suggesting that a longer period of active social movement unionism helps 
those wins. 
 ULTA’s 2015 contract won class-size caps for the district and $13 million earmarked to 
reduce the district’s student counselor ratio to below 500-to-1 in every school.  The caps and 
earmarked money are wins for the union in that it establishes district caps that limit class size 
and hopefully better the student’s opportunity for counseling, a necessary department for 
students to attend higher education.  However the caps themselves are still quite high (46 for 
juniors and seniors) and a goal of a 500-to-1 student to counselor ratio is a barely adequate one.   
 Although CTU heavily featured education reform in their 2012 campaign, pushing for 
smaller class sizes, a richer curriculum in underfunded schools, and increase in funding for the 
arts and physical education, they were unable to get the district to negotiate on any of those non-
economic issues. 
 However, CTU’s 2016 campaign was able to win numerous education policy changes 
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from the district, most notably pushing Mayor Emanuel to withdraw $88 million from the TIF 
fund to increase CPS funding.  CTU won enforceable class-size caps for elementary schools with 
$7 million earmarked to provide teachers assistants for any classes that run over the caps.  $10 - 
$27 million was earmarked to provide after-school programs, counseling, social work, 
psychiatric services, and medical clinics at 20-55 community schools designated by a joint 
committee of union members and CPS officials.  The contract also temporarily ended charter 
expansion and banned school closings for two years after the contract and reduced the measures 
for closing schools for the following two years. 
There are three main lessons for how a union can more successfully build internal 
strength and power in a union reformed to a social movement union.  First, the difficult task of 
mobilizing rank and file members can be done effectively with the creation of an organizing 
department and questionably feasible without.  Second, moving people to action is the basis of 
an effective social movement unionist strategy.  Third, providing alternative visions of what the 
union and school reform projects could be are important to building internal (and community) 
support. 
Mobilizing rank and file teachers in a 30,000-person union is a difficult and large 
undertaking; teachers are already stretched for time by the nature of their profession and if the 
current leadership pushes a weak service union model, the members may already have an 
apathetic relationship with the union.  Both CTU in 2010 and UTLA in 2014 created departments 
and hired organizers for the express purpose of activating rank and file members through 
working their way down the union bureaucracy chain, specifically targeting shop stewards to 
then train and encourage their school members to action.  5+ full time organizers in districts with 
over 600 schools do an immense amount of work, and without those full-time organizers the 
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union needs to rely on current members to move other members to action.  UTLA in 2009 
resembled this alternative.  The union leadership wanted to create a more active membership but 
didn’t focus the effort internally by pushing ideas of agency and action down the ranks of the 
leadership.  The result was a union attempting to use external strategies of social movement 
unionism without fully committing resources to developing internal momentum to back up the 
strategies.   
The importance of building internal strength and changing the idea of what it means to be 
a member to include taking action is paramount to a social movement union’s success.  While 
activating members through their stewards at their school site is a basic tenant of organizing, the 
focus on creating school-site committees that can recognize issues at their schools and win 
battles on that level really works to galvanize members.  A successful minor win can act as an 
example of the impact the union can have when members act together, creating a greater sense of 
agency and solidarity within the union.  That is why having the organizing department is so 
helpful, as there is someone pushing stewards to develop that kind of committee while providing 
them with training and resources on how to do so.  That localized relationship with the union can 
then expand to be used in larger external pressure campaigns such as a contract campaign or in 
reaction to aggressive corporate education rollout.  Building an active membership this way is 
necessary because between public actions, meeting with parents, building coalitions, and creating 
a democratic flow of ideas from the rank and file to the leadership, social movement unionism 
requires an immense amount of work.  However, if a membership is committed to action, there 
are many people ready to do that work. 
Promoting alternative visions of the union and public education reform that are reinforced 
with evidence and concrete examples is important for building excitement and support from the 
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public and membership.  Although the conclusion is not exclusive to social movement unionism, 
a shift to a SMU usually requires winning internal union elections.  Building support is necessary 
for those campaigns as well as showing to the public that there is another way to improve public 
schools.  The Schools LA/Chicago Students Deserve reports served the purpose of proving there 
is a possible alternative, although one was more directed at the public (Chicago’s case) and one 
more directed at membership (LA).  This promotion of vision is a tool for trying to work against 
the passivity that can come from disappointment in the union and is a step towards mobilizing 
members towards action. 
  Generating the reports and vision in tandem with parents and community members is 
paramount to building public support for two reasons.  Firstly, from an ideological standpoint, a 
social movement teachers union should have a vision of public education that is responsive to the 
interests of parents and students.  Also, from a strategic standpoint, when a union creates ways to 
include and be responsive to parents, it defends itself against attacks that union agendas benefit 
the teachers at the cost of students.  Also, the reports show real potential public school 
improvements when media sources frequently only cover corporate education reform as a viable 
solution to a struggling school, in part because that is the only kind of reform being pushed and 
therefore covered by media reports. 
 Turner’s theory that separates moments of the coalition building process into three types - 
events, campaigns, and institutional consolidation - can be used to analyze UTLA and CTU’s 
process of coalition building.  The first two types of events and campaigns can be understood as 
fitting into each union’s contract campaign of escalating actions as they were “sustained efforts 
over a period of time with multiple tactics aimed at a specific goal.”173  Although the goals were 
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more directly those of the union in these examples, Chicago’s 2016 contract campaign led to real 
improvements in Chicago’s public schools.   In LA’s case, CORE partnered with the Latino 
Caucus, Coalition for Educational Justice, and other community organizations to form The 
Schools L.A. Students Deserve, which is still UTLA’s leading plan for making change in 
LAUSD.   
However, the final coalition building step of institutional consolidation, defined as 
“networks based on previous events/campaigns uniting into new organizations for creating future 
opportunities to further the common politics,” is more difficult to assign actions to and is the 
basis for moving towards social movement unionism.  CTU’s 2012 strike and subsequent 
organizing has elicited so much excitement from leftists and labor movement not just because of 
the significance of the 2012 win, but because it has flirted with institutional consolidation.  CTU 
used its organizational power and connection to a population of the city to expand into Chicago 
politics and ran CTU president Karen Lewis as a candidate for Mayor.  Lewis fell ill and CTU 
instead ran Chuy Garcia (previously a Cook County commissioner) forcing Rahm Emanuel into 
a runoff election he closely won.  Despite that loss, the closeness of the race demonstrates the 
potential political power of the union, which was able to elect CTU’s candidate and member 
Susan Sadlowski Garza to city council.  UTLA has not had the same extension of broader 
working class politics to issues outside of education, but has had some electoral success in the 
larger LA politics by winning seats on the school board.  UTLA has not demonstrated any clear 
institutional consolidation but they have had less time as a union driven by a SMU (2014 - 2017 
as opposed to 2010 - 2017) and have an optimistic future with an active membership and 
growing coalition.   
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Creating External Pressure on the District 
 The strategies each union took to apply pressure to the district in their contract campaigns 
were very similar with slight variations in actions.  Both unions planned a series of escalating 
actions ending at the last days of possible negotiation in preparation for a potential strike should 
negotiations stall.  These were backed up by their coalition partners and public support.  This 
section will briefly discuss the similar actions each union took to apply pressure to the district in 
the escalating campaigns, their union-sponsored campaigns for local elected office and then the 
differences in the strategies. 
CTU and UTLA’s strategies and following actions differed little in their escalating 
contract campaigns.  The strategy was to hold a series of public actions that progressively got 
larger in preparation for a strike while simultaneously building public support for the 
strike.  Both unions picketed at their schools before/after school, held large public rallies in their 
downtown areas, and took over/protested school board meetings.   
These actions at their most simple do three important things for the campaign with 
different actions doing certain things particularly well.  Public actions act as a practice for school 
stewards to organize their co-workers for future events, ideally getting a larger turnout at each 
progressive action through better outreach and developing leaders to mobilize more members in 
each school for the action.  They are also opportunities for parent liaisons or members 
responsible for parent outreach to grow their network of involved parents, and to educate parents 
and students on the campaign.  These actions also push some level of pressure on the district by 
the nature of public protest by showing the willingness of teachers and partnered public to act in 
opposition to their policies.   
Picketing schools before or after school does not disrupt the school day and serves as a 
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particularly good action to reach out to parents and students to explain the union’s fight and 
alternate vision for public education.  Protesting and/or occupying school board meetings is a 
more militant action as it takes such a stand against the district’s agenda that it fully disrupts the 
meeting and ability for them to function as they normally would.  Public rallies demonstrate the 
potential public force and support for a potential strike and are a strong expression of strength 
behind the union and against the district. 
Organizing and mobilizing members and public support works cyclically in that once an 
organizer develops a group of local leaders, those local leaders can then work to grow their 
network of actionable members and developing leaders and the cycle can continue.  To grow a 
sustainable movement, a series of escalating actions provides dates and checkpoints to organize 
around, with the growing support from membership and hopefully the public, leading to the final 
action that puts a massive amount of stress and pressure on the city.  Because some actions are 
more militant and people may be less easily convinced to participate in these, the climb from 
easier actions to more difficult actions prepares people to be more willing to participate in a 
difficult action after having a positive experience being involved with a less intense one.  The 
cyclical tendency of asking members and parents to take action functions as the basis for SMU as 
it relies on growing participation and a political solidarity that extends past the workplace.   
The idea of building a series of escalating actions with heavy participation from union 
members, parents, and coalition members all operates on the basis of a threat to strike.  The 
actions show the union is prepared and willing to strike if the district is unwilling to negotiate 
with the union’s terms.  Both UTLA’s contract campaign and CTU’s 2016 campaign did not go 
to strike but were able to secure wins through their threat of that.  A teacher’s strike can be 
especially damaging to a city, and so the threat of a strike supported by the public is 
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significant.  UTLA in 2009 was prepared to strike to protest the large number of layoffs, but an 
injunction was filed against the strike and it was ruled illegal and the union lost momentum and 
power with no final pressure for the district.  The following section explicates why a teachers 
union strike can be so dangerous and therefore why the threat of a well-supported strike is 
significant, followed by the differences in strategies between CTU and UTLA on pressuring the 
district. 
Differences in Strategy to Exert Pressure on the District 
There were few differences between the union’s contract campaigns since UTLA heavily 
modeled theirs on CTU’s 2012 campaign (with the exception of CTU’s actual strike).   The 
following section will go through the differences that did exist in tactics and actions taken 
outside of the contract campaigns.   
In 2012, CTU went on strike for seven days while the bargaining team negotiated with 
the district.  After the first five days, the bargaining team suggested accepting the contract offer, 
but the house of delegates voted against it, proposing to continue the strike for two more days 
and vote again after consulting with the membership.  Two days later the delegates decided to 
suspend the strike and move the contract to membership ratification, which it passed.  During the 
strike, teachers first picketed outside of their own schools (660 schools) with sometimes 
consolidating their picketing to 144 locations that were targeted with specific coalition and 
parent support.   
Like most public sector jobs, a teacher’s strike has a greater impact than a loss of profits, 
as compared to private sector strike might.  Schools allow a large portion of the labor force to 
work while their children are cared for during that nine-to-five period of time.  If schools close 
across a city due to a teacher strike, parents who would normally be working find themselves 
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with the problem of where to send their kids when they are at work.  Cities can respond by 
keeping select schools open as ‘holding centers’ by employing under-trained monitors instead of 
teachers, but that can only act as a short term solution and is often expensive to set up.  Although 
students’ loss of school time provides some pressure on a government to try to end the strike 
through negotiations, most pressure comes from parents directly complaining about their 
children’s lack of opportunity to learn and their being unable to go to work, from businesses that 
employ these parents, and from the cost of maintaining emergency school systems.  By the same 
token, as parents are people who are most negatively impacted by the strike, parental frustration 
can be pointed at the union if the strike continues beyond what they see as reasonable.  It is also 
worth noting that the most affected parents tend to be those in the most precarious situations, 
such as being a single parent, having a rigid employment schedule, and/or living in general 
poverty. 
UTLA has used in-school tactics that directly defy district rules and agendas, specifically 
organizing boycotts of city-mandated standardized testing in 2009 and faculty meetings in 
2015.  While picketing, holding public rallies, and disrupting school board meetings all pressure 
the district, boycotting standardized testing and faculty meetings directly impedes the district’s 
ability to function as the authority of LAUSD education.  Most of the social movement unionist 
tactics do not directly disrupt district agenda and what happens in schools, but instead cultivate 
public support for a strike, which stops education entirely.  Internal organizing and coalition 
building may require a worker to sacrifice time or take a risk by standing up to a principal, but 
they do not risk punitive measures in the same way that boycotting does.  This tactic has two 
effects. It could bring about the changes in the public education system that the teachers 
envision, and also has the potential to build a stronger sense of solidarity among workers, as 
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taking larger risks together tends to lead to a higher commitment to each other.   
Lessons from the Strategies used to Pressure the District. 
Internal power building’s primary goal is to mobilize members to action, build coalitions, 
and build public support for an alternative vision of public education improvements.  The 
primary strategy of pressuring the district by these social movement unionist teachers unions is 
to build growing support in a contract campaign with a series of escalating actions with the final 
power over the district being a strike (or threat of the strike). 
When comparing the efficacy of these two unions’ ability to respond to corporate 
education reform, or attacks on teachers while operating under a social movement union model 
versus an earlier service modelm the social movement union model is more successful.  Despite 
achieving mostly defensive wins, UTLA and CTU secured better contracts after each union 
reform project, and the following lessons can be drawn from the campaigns of each union.  Both 
of these teachers unions’ successful contract campaigns were based on the same strategy; build 
pressure on the district with escalating actions and increasing public involvement in preparation 
for a strike, using that threat of a potential well-organized and supported strike as the primary 
power in negotiating.  That external strategy is only possible with a successful internal union 
reform and coalition building project, of which is heavily aided by; creating internal departments 
to mobilize the rank and file and parents, providing alternative visions of school and union 
improvements, and an understanding that moving people to take action is the basis of SMU.   
SMU requires far more resources than a service union model, but for public sector 
teachers unions, the cases demonstrate that it can produce a more successful union judged on 
ability to secure wages and benefits and be more resilient to attacks.  However, it is more 
difficult to evaluate SMU’s capacity to create larger political change than within the extended 
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union purview, such as education policy changes.  It is difficult because political impact can be 
less tangible than concrete changes and because these unions have only been progressing 
towards more effective SMUs over a relatively short period of time, and the political impact 
potentially has yet to be realized.  This is not to overstate the significance of SMU as seen 
through UTLA and CTU and hail them and SMU as the future of the left, particularly as their 
wins are still most defensive.  However, their successful coalition building and in the case of 
Chicago, institutional consolidation of political momentum, can hopefully provide part of a 

















CHAPTER 5: Conclusion 
The previous analysis section focused on key lessons of strategy employed by UTLA and 
CTU to develop stronger social movement unionism, and based on those cases, open the 
discussion of the potential political impact of SMU.  Along with this are the questions of SMU’s 
ability to fight corporate education reform in the future.  This conclusion will discuss the 
plausibility of extending those lessons and in turn, SMU’s efficacy to teachers’ unions in the rest 
of the U.S. and then more broadly, public sector unions.  Finally, the section will look to explain 
what teachers’ unions SMU mean for the ongoing question of revitalizing the labor movement.   
Aggressive corporate education reform is unfortunately a national and widespread 
movement supported by politicians and private capital, whereas these examples of SMU 
teachers’ unions are infrequent and based locally in cities.  While they can limit the attacks on 
public education in their areas, they certainly cannot save public education as a whole, let alone 
solve nationwide problems of de-facto segregation and underfunding.  However, if enough 
teachers’ unions are able to make the transformation, effectively making concrete gains for 
public education and form supportive networks with one another, perhaps that voice in favor of 
the public can be extended from local politics to a national level. 
UTLA and CTU were more successful operating as a SMU than a service model in 
securing wages and benefits, combating corporate education reform, and growing support for 
public education, and therefore it logically follows that teachers unions in a similar context 
seeking to blunt attacks from corporate education reform should consider adopting SMU.  Other 
reform caucuses across the country have tried to make this shift, but many have struggled, 
similarly to LA, over winning full leadership and in turn, being able to institute internal changes 
and commit the membership to SMU.  As discussed in the internal organizing section, there are 
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numerous barriers to mobilizing a membership, including leadership in the union adhering to a 
service model.  Although it is worth looking to PEAC’s election strategies, there is a significant 
variability between different tates labor laws, city’s education policy, and relationship to the 
union that the struggle to win membership to SMU will depend heavily on individual contexts. 
Although teachers unions are particularly well suited to SMU compared to other public 
sector work because of their close proximity to the public and sheer size (unionized teachers are 
the single largest group of unionized workers in the U.S.) other public sector unions might 
consider moving towards a SMU approach.  Other public sector unions also serve the public and 
can still build their contract campaign by forming coalitions with constituents and clients and 
frame their demands in terms of public policy and discourse.  Public sector unions also generally 
negotiate with the city/state as one employer, allowing for single contract campaigns for large 
numbers of workers.  While it is entirely plausible for other public sector unions to embrace 
SMU, the individual context and differences in labor laws from state to state will still have a 
huge influence on a SMU’s viability.  That is not to say that SMU is untenable in the South or in 
states with less favorable labor laws, but this paper focused on SMU under Democratic state and 
city conditions. 
Under the current political climate, more unions should move towards SMU or at least a 
highly involved rank and file, as it may be the best strategy for self-preservation against right-to-
work laws.  As Republicans hold the Presidency, and the majority in Congress and on the 
Supreme Court, the U.S. should prepare for national right-to-work law to come into effect, 
whether coming through Congress or the Supreme Court.  Building a democratic union structure 
that encourages rank and file involvement and action will have a much easier time collecting 
dues than a service model.  UTLA’s recent 82% membership vote to increase dues by fifty 
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percent serves as a strong example of how an active membership is willing to pay into a union 
they believe in.   
 SMU can and has been used in the private sector and is still based on the model of rank 
and file involvement and making broader political change through grassroots organizing, but the 
coalition building and the strategy of pressuring employers operates very differently.  
Negotiating with private capital instead of the state directly changes the dynamics of power 
between the worker and employer, in turn changing the kinds of demands and strategies 
necessary for reaching those goals.  The healthcare sector, often operating through public and 
private partnerships would be a natural target for private sector SMU.   
Despite the excitement around it, public sector SMU will probably not be the savior to 
labor’s decline, but is cause for some potential optimism around revitalizing the labor movement 
and left politics in general.  Public sector unions are not the most important targets in reviving 
labor as there has been little change in the total number of public sector employees over the past 
50 years and public sector employees make up less than a fifth of the total workforce; the decline 
in union density came from the private sector.174  A rise in public sector unions adopting SMU 
would not increase union density significantly, but because political demands of the union 
operate in the public discourse of local policy and therefore are a voice in the conflict over urban 
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